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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights' (TRIPS Agreement) was adopted in Marrakesh in
April 1994, commentators marveled at its success in establishing in-
ternational minimum standards for the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.2 Apart from copyrights, patents, and
* C 2019 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and Director,
Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions of this
Article were presented at the 8th International Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable
at Florida State University College of Law, the 15th Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual
Property (WIPIP) Colloquium at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, the
"Changing Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Pricing, Intellectual Property, Trade and Ethics"
Symposium at McGeorge School of Law at the University of the Pacific, a "IP & Trade Policy
Today" seminar at the World Trade Organization in Geneva, and a webinar organized by the
Centre for Information and Innovation Law at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark.
The Author is grateful to Frederick Abbott, Timo Minssen, Michael Mireles, Craig Nard,
Aaron Perzanowski, Antony Taubman, Jayashree Watal, and Jakob Wested for their kind
invitations, Eric Solovy for a spirited debate in the webinar, and the participants of these
events for valuable comments and suggestions.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2. As a World Trade Organization panel observed in the intellectual property enforce-
ment area:
The inclusion of [Part III] on enforcement in the TRIPS Agreement was one of
the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round negotiations as it expanded
the scope of enforcement aspect of intellectual property rights. Prior to the
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trademarks-the three main branches of intellectual property law-
the TRIPS Agreement also harmonized the international standards for
five additional categories of intellectual property rights-namely,
trade secrets, geographical indications, industrial designs, layout de-
signs of integrated circuits, and plant variety protections.3
Although these standards have greatly benefited countries exporting
intellectual property-based goods and services-and, by extension,
their intellectual property industries-policymakers in developing
countries and their supporting commentators and nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) have widely criticized the TRIPS Agreement for im-
posing on developing countries "one size fits all" standards-or, more
precisely, "supersize fits all" standards.4 These high standards have cre-
ated heavy economic burdens on these countries while impeding their
TRIPS Agreement, provisions related to enforcement were limited to general ob-
ligations to provide legal remedies and seizure of infringing goods.
Panel Report, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶ 8.97, WTO
Doe. WT/DS176/R (adopted Aug. 6, 2001); see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 2008) ("The enforcement section of the TRIPS
Agreement is clearly one of the major achievements of the negotiation."); U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV.-INTL CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROJECT ON INTELLECTUAL PROP.
RIGHTS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 629 (2005) [here-
inafter TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK] ("The introduction of a detailed set of enforcement rules as
part of TRIPS has been . .one of the major innovations of this Agreement.").
3. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9-40 (establishing these standards).
4. See Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factor-
ing in the "Technologically Proficient" Developing Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 100, 110 (Jeremy de Beer
ed., 2009) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA] (alluding to the "one-
'super-size'-fits-all model"); Jeremy de Beer, Defining WIPO's Development Agenda, in
IMPLEMENTING WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra, at 1, 3 (referring to "a one-size, espe-
cially a supersize, model of global [intellectual property] law"); James Boyle, A Manifesto on
WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, at 3-4 ("One
size fits all. And it is 'extra large.' ").
5. See Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries into a New
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, in CAN. GOVT DEP'T FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT'L
TRADE, TRADE POLICY RESEARCH 2001, at 19, 21 (2001) ("TRIPS does not involve mutual
gain; rather, it positions the WTO primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related
rents on behalf of multinational corporations . . . ."); WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2002: MAKING TRADE WORK FOR THE WORLD'S
POOR xvii (2002) (estimating that "rent transfers to major technology-creating countries-
particularly the United States, Germany, and France-in the form of pharmaceutical pa-
tents, computer chip designs, and other intellectual property, would amount to more than
$20 billion"); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 889
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, The International Enclosure Movement] (noting that the unques-
tioned adoption of foreign intellectual property standards "might ... exacerbate the dire
economic plight of less developed countries by allowing foreign rights holders to crush local
industries through the threats of litigation, or even actual litigation"); J. Michael Finger,
The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 9 (Asian Dev. Bank,
Econ. & Research Dep't Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2002), https://www.adb.org/
sites/default/files/publication/283 16/wp02 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ8Q-2S9H] (stating that
"TRIPS developing countries took on as legal obligation a cost of $60 billion per year").
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access to information, knowledge, and essential medicines.6 In addition,
the TRIPS standards have eroded their much-needed policy space to de-
sign an intellectual property system that is tailored to "local needs, na-
tional interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and
public health conditions."7
Regardless of one's perspective, the harmonization project ad-
vanced by the TRIPS Agreement,8 and continued through TRIPS-plus
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements,9 has been at the fore-
front of the international intellectual property debate. While this Ar-
ticle is interested in exploring this continuous, and continuously con-
troversial, project at this well-timed juncture when the TRIPS Agree-
ment celebrates its twenty-fifth anniversary, the discussion here will
focus on a topic that international intellectual property scholars have
underexplored: the limits to TRIPS harmonization.
To help examine these limits, this Article focuses on the protections
for undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical
products.o This focus is chosen for three reasons. First, until the adop-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement, such protections "ha [ve] never been the
6. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
370 (2006) ('The strong protection mandated under the TRIPs Agreement ... threatens their
much-needed access to information, knowledge, and essential medicines.").
7. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 828; see also Peter K.
Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears ofACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 1037 (2011) ("[A]1though
promoting uniform rules may be beneficial, greater harmonization of legal standards could
take away the valuable opportunities for experimentation with new regulatory and economic
policies.").
8. For the Author's earlier discussions of these harmonization efforts, see generally
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime,
38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 429-35 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents]; Peter
K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About Intellectual Property
and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218 (2003).
9. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting essays that discuss free trade
agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee Weatherall,
Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia Free
Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 259 (criti-
cizing the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents,
supra note 8, at 392-400 (discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agree-
ments to push for higher intellectual property standards).
10. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3 (providing protections for undisclosed
test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products). The definition of "test data"
is obvious. As Carlos Correa pointed out: "Test data is the information generated to demon-
strate the efficacy and safety of new chemical entities for use as pharmaceuticals or agrochem-
icals. In the case of pharmaceuticals, such data include the results of pre-clinical studies (phar-
macodynamic, pharmacokinetic, and toxicological tests) and of phases 1 to 3 of clinical studies."
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 375 (2007). However, there is no standard definition
of the term "other data." See id. at 377 (noting that "'other data' may include ... manufacturing,
conservation, and packaging methods and conditions, but only to the extent hat it is necessary
to submit them in order to obtain marketing approval").
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subject of any multilateral agreement." " Because no international
minimum standards existed, the standards in that agreement provide
a highly instructive example of the TRIPS harmonization project. Sec-
ond, the protection of undisclosed test or other data remains highly
controversial in recent international intellectual property negotia-
tions. These negotiations include those involving the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP),12 which has now become the Comprehensive and
11. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 4 (2001); see also CORREA, supra note 10, at 366 (noting that Section 7 of Part II
of the TRIPS Agreement provides "the first international regime on undisclosed infor-
mation," and describing the protection of undisclosed test or other data as "one of the most
significant innovations brought about by the TRIPS Agreement"); GERVAIS, supra note 2, at
424 ("[The field] of what in various national laws may be called 'trade secrets', 'confidential
information' or the like . . . is not regulated in multilateral conventions, apart from the gen-
eral obligations in respect of unfair competition found in art. 10bis of the Paris Convention."
(footnote omitted)); TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 522 ("TRIPS is the first inter-
national convention specifically imposing obligations on undisclosed information, including
test data."); Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age of Big Data, Biologics, and Plurilat-
erals, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. ARGUENDO 22, 23 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Data Exclusivities] ("Ar-
ticle 39.3 provides the earliest multilateral protection for clinical trial data that have been
submitted to regulatory authorities for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts."). As recounted in the RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT, put together by
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the International Centre on
Trade and Sustainable Development:
Differences in pre-existing comparative law were even greater with regard to test
data relating to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals. Only a few countries had
developed rules on the matter before the negotiation of TRIPS. Thus, the USA
introduced a regulatory data protection regime for pesticides in 1972, and in
1984 adopted regulatory exclusivity provisions for medicines. The latter provided
for five years of exclusivity for new chemical entities, and three years for data
filed in support of authorizations based on new clinical research relating to chem-
ical entities which have already been approved for therapeutic use. The EU mem-
ber states provided exclusivity protection for the data filed in support of market-
ing authorization for pharmaceuticals since 1987.
TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 522.
12. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP Agreement],
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-
text [https://perma.cc/AMZ6-Z3YC]. For the Author's discussions of the TPP, see generally
Peter K. Yu, The ACTA/TPP Country Clubs, in ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE:
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE 258
(Dana Beldiman ed., 2013); Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossuergence of Asian Intel-
lectual Property Standards [hereinafter Yu, Crossuergence], in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND
CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., 2018) [herein-
after GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY]; Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of
Copyright Norm-setting in the Asian Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN
PACIFIC: JUXTAPOSING HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C.
Lai eds., 2018) [hereinafter Yu, Copyright Norm-setting]; Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About TPP]; Peter K. Yu, TPP and
Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1129 (2014).
2019] DATA EXCLUSIVITIES 645
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP);13 the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 14 which is
under negotiation between Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zea-
land, South Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN); 1" and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), 16 which was signed in November 2018 and will likely re-
place the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)" in the
near future.1 8 Third, many new issues have arisen in relation to the
protection of undisclosed test or other data. Among these issues are
the arrival of big-data analytics in research and development (R&D)
for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products, the ongoing effort to
develop international minimum standards for the protection of biolog-
ics, 9 China's innovative turn and its continued reforms in the patent
and pharmaceutical areas,20 and the increasing use of other interna-
tional regulations and fora to address intellectual property disputes
13. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8,
2018 [hereinafter CPTPP], https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/
free-trade- agreements-concluded-but -not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-
agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text [https://perma.cc/37HP-EGTZ]; see also Yu,
Thinking About TPP, supra note 12, at 104-06 (discussing the CPTPP); N.Z. GoVt Ministry For-
eign Aff. & Trade, CPTPP u. TPP, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/
agreements-under-negotiation/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained/
[https://perma.cc/3UYA-2SNM] (explaining the differences between the TPP and the
CPTPP).
14. See ASEAN Plus Six, Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Re-
gional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Joint Declaration],
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/news/Documents/joint-declaration-
on-the-launch-of-negotiations-for-the-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CGP8-XHA4] (launching the RCEP negotiations).
15. For the Author's analysis of the RCEP, see generally Peter K. Yu, The RCEP Nego-
tiations and Asian Intellectual Property Norm Setters, in THE FUTURE OF ASIAN TRADE
DEALS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Liu Kung-Chung & Julien Chaisse eds., forthcoming
2019) [hereinafter Yu, Norm Setters]; Yu, Crossuergence, supra note 12; Yu, Copyright Norm-
setting, supra note 12; Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property
Norms, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific
Norms]. The ten ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Ma-
laysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Member Countries,
ASS'N SE. ASIAN NATIONS, https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ [https://perma.cc/
JD8Y-ADEW].
16. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Nov. 30, 2018 [herein-
after USMCA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-
canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/N3GZ-YR7N].
17. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
18. See Glenn Thrush, Trump Says He Plans to Withdraw from Nafta, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/politics/trump-withdraw-nafta.html
[https://perma.cc/6M8T-4PP5] (reporting President Trump's announcement of his intention
to withdraw the United States from NAFTA).
19. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
20. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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and questions.2 1 Taken together, all of these TRIPS and TRIPS-plus
developments provide important insights into the efforts to develop in-
ternational minimum standards for the protection of undisclosed test
or other data in the past twenty-five years.
Part II of this Article briefly revisits the TRIPS negotiations under
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Uruguay
Round).2 2 This Part focuses on issues on which the TRIPS negotiating
parties had achieved consensus or had failed to do so. It further dis-
cusses the tensions and conflicts between members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), using as an illustration the TRIPS dispute be-
tween Argentina and the United States over the inadequate protection
of undisclosed test or other data.23
Part III turns to the development of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional,
and plurilateral agreements. This Part examines the negotiation of
new international minimum standards for the protection of undis-
closed test or other data. Although the early bilateral agreements ini-
tiated by the United States in the mid-2000s included treaty language
enhancing such protection,2 4 this Part focuses on the three latest re-
gional or plurilateral agreements: the TPP Agreement, the proposed
RCEP Agreement, and the recently signed USMCA.
21. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
22. See generally GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 3-27 (describing the origins and develop-
ment of the TRIPS Agreement); DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002) (examining the role of intellectual property indus-
tries in the TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96-120 (2003) (recounting the trilateral
intellectual property discussions among the United States, the European Union, and Japan);
WATAL, supra note 11, at 11-47 (recounting the negotiation process for the TRIPS Agree-
ment); Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 6, at 371-79 (examining four different
accounts of origins of the TRIPS Agreement).
23. See Request for Consultations by the United States, Argentina-Patent Protection
for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WTO Doc.
WT/DS 17 1/1 (May 10, 1999) [hereinafter WTO Complaint 1]; Request for Consultations by
the United States, Argentina-Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data,
WTO Doc. WT/DS196/1 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter WTO Complaint 2]. See generally
KENNETH C. SHADLEN, COALITIONS AND COMPLIANCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 63-87, 141-67 (2017) (discussing the changing
political landscape surrounding the push for greater protection for pharmaceutical patents
in Argentina).
24. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.10.1,
Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR], http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/
P24B-TS8P]; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 17.10.1, May
18, 2004 [hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/australian-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/YA7V-3BWS]; United States-Singa-




To provide a holistic perspective, Part IV goes beyond the tradi-
tional discussion of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus treaty negotiations to iden-
tify three sets of additional complications that have affected develop-
ments at both the multilateral and nonmultilateral levels. This Part
examines 1) the arrival of new technologies, such as the use of big-data
analytics in R&D and the growing importance and popularity of bio-
logics and personalized medicines; 2) the arrival of new politics, such
as China's changing position in the patent and pharmaceutical areas
and the recent amendments o its patent laws and pharmaceutical reg-
ulations; and 3) the arrival of new spillovers of regulatory standards
from international regimes lying outside the intellectual property
area, such as trade, investment, and data governance.
Part V concludes by drawing six distinct lessons regarding the
TRIPS harmonization project. While the analysis in this Article could
be interpreted as either strengthening or weakening this project, de-
pending on whether one looks at the TRIPS Agreement as a glass half
full or a glass half empty, this Article aims to offer a more cautious and
nuanced assessment of the TRIPS Agreement's ability to facilitate the
international harmonization project. After all, there has been no better
time than the Agreement's silver anniversary to take stock of the
strengths and weaknesses of this project.
II. TRIPS AGREEMENT
The TRIPS Agreement was adopted in Marrakesh in April 1994. As
stated in its preamble, the Agreement was established to achieve three
key objectives.25 First, it lays out the "adequate standards and princi-
ples concerning the availability, scope and use of trade-related intel-
lectual property rights."26 Second, the Agreement provides "effective
and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellec-
tual property rights, taking into account differences in national legal
systems."27 Third, the Agreement institutes "effective and expeditious
procedures for the multilateral prevention and settlement of disputes
between governments."28
25. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl., recital 2. In addition to these three objec-
tives, Recital 2 recognizes "the need for new rules and disciplines concerning. . . the applica-
bility of the basic principles of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 1994 and of
relevant international intellectual property agreements or conventions ... [and] transitional
arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in the results of the negotiations." Id.
26. Id. recital 2(b).
27. Id. recital 2(c).
28. Id. recital 2(d).
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Although Section C will implicate the mandatory WTO dispute set-
tlement process,29 this Part focuses primarily on the development of
protection standards, and more specifically on those concerning undis-
closed test and other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical prod-
ucts. Section A explores the issues on which the TRIPS negotiating
parties achieved consensus. Section B turns to the various areas in
which the TRIPS language remains highly contested and in which the
TRIPS negotiating parties eventually failed to achieve any interna-
tional consensus. To further illustrate the significant disagreement be-
tween these parties during the TRIPS negotiations, Section C exam-
ines a key dispute between Argentina and the United States over the
lack of protections for undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceuti-
cal and agrochemical products.
A. Consensus
As Jayashree Watal, a former TRIPS negotiator for India who now
works in the WTO Intellectual Property, Government Procurement
and Competition Division, observed, the protection of undisclosed in-
formation "has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement"
until the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement.3 0 Such information in-
cludes the test or other data that pharmaceutical and agrochemical
companies are legally required to submit to regulatory authorities for
marketing approval of their products.31 While the submitted data are
confidential, proprietary, and highly valuable, the authorities need
them to evaluate the products' safety and efficacy. Should the pharma-
ceutical and agrochemical companies not submit the requested data,
they will be unable to secure the needed approval to market their prod-
ucts. Should they comply with the request, however, their competitors
may take unfair commercial advantage of their proprietary data.
3 2
29. For the Author's discussions of the WTO dispute settlement process, see generally
Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Economics of International Intellectual Property Agreements,
in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 282, 298-309 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni B.
Ramello eds., 2016); Peter K. Yu, State-to-State and Investor-State Copyright Dispute Settle-
ment, in LES RECOURS EN 1VIATIERE DE DROIT D'AUTEUR (Ysolde Gendreau ed., forthcoming
2019); Peter K. Yu, Are Developing Countries Playing a Better TRIPS Game?, 16 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 311, 333-36 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, TRIPS Game].
30. WATAL, supra note 11, at 4.
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018) ("Any person may file with the Secretary an appli-
cation with respect to any drug subject to the provisions of subsection (a). Such person shall
submit to the Secretary as a part of the application . . . full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use . . . .").
32. As the European Commission observed:
Proponents of data exclusivity, as it exists in the [European Community] or the
US, defending the interests of the R&D based pharmaceutical industry, argue
that Article 39.3 was intended to prevent generic manufacturers from relying
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Protection is therefore needed for undisclosed test or other data sub-
mitted to regulatory authorities.
To provide protection for these data, Article 39.1 states that, "[i]n
the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition
as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members
shall protect ... data submitted to governments or governmental agen-
cies in accordance with paragraph 3."33 Article 39.3 further provides:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the market-
ing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which
utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort,
shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition,
Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.34
The first sentence of Article 39.3 focuses on the obligation to protect
"against unfair commercial use."35 Based on the provision's ordinary
meaning, this obligation will not arise unless five conditions have been
met. First, to warrant protection, the test or other data at issue must
be undisclosed-or, more properly worded, undisclosed to the public3 6
at the time of submission.37 Second, the protection is available to data
upon the originator's data as a "shortcut" to marketing approval, by giving the
originator exclusive use of its data for a period of time sufficient for it to recoup
the costs incurred in running trial tests and producing and compiling data for
submission to regulatory authorities.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, COMPULSORY LICENSING AND DATA PROTECTION 18 (2006),
https://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/eu-_compulsorylicensing.pdf?398 10/
bledc6f4e4e32aff8c6f72eb553b3fcac28be6c1 [https://perma.cc/D3NE-4EJ4].
33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also CORREA, supra note 10, at 381 ("The ordinary meaning of'unfair' is 'not
equitable or honest or impartial or according to rules'. In the case of Article 39.3, this concept
must be understood in the light of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention." (quoting CONCISE
OXFORD DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1982)) (footnote omitted)).
36. As Daniel Gervais explained:
The expression used in the Agreement, i.e. "undisclosed information" was chosen
to avoid referring to an expression linked to a given legal system. The result may
be misleading, however, because what is protected is not really "undisclosed" in-
formation (since, if no one has disclosed it to anyone, it could not be used at all),
but rather information disclosed selectively and under precise conditions.
GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 424.
37. See G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data
Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 35 (2003)
('TRIPS Article 39.3 only requires that the data be undisclosed as of the date of submission.
There is no express condition that the data remain undisclosed after submission in order to
maintain protection.").
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for pharmaceutical or agrochemical products only.3 8 Third, the prod-
ucts involved have to "utilize new chemical entities"39 -a term that has
intentionally been left undefined at the TRIPS negotiations40 but has
since become quite controversial in the developing world.41 Fourth, the
test data have to be submitted "as a condition of approving the mar-
keting of' these products,4 2 not on a voluntary basis.43 Finally, the orig-
ination of the protected data has to "involveH a considerable effort,"44
somewhat akin, but not necessarily identical, to the requirement of "a
substantial investment" in the EU Database Directive.45
The second sentence of Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement focuses
on the obligation to protect against the disclosure of submitted test or
other data.4 6 This obligation is similar to the obligation laid down in
Article 1711.6 of NAFTA, which states that "no person other than the
person that submitted them may, without the latter's permission, rely
on such data in support of an application for product approval during
38. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3 (covering only test or other data that
have been submitted "as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of ag-
ricultural chemical products").
39. Id.
40. See CORREA, supra note 10, at 379 ("The TRIPS Agreement has deliberately avoided
defining the concept of 'new chemical entity', thus deferring such definition to national law.
This is one of the clear areas in which Member countries enjoy room for manoeuvre to im-
plement the Agreement's provisions."); see also WATAL, supra note 11, at 7 (advancing the
concept of "constructive ambiguity").
41. See Srividhya Ragavan, Data Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market Monopoly, 8
JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 241, 252-55 (2017) [hereinafter Ragavan, Data Exclusivity] (noting
the controversy surrounding the term "new chemical entities"); see also GERVAIS, supra note
2, at 427 ("[T]here could ... be significant divergences of views on the precise meaning of
'new chemical entities', in particular as regards their novelty." (footnote omitted)). The word
"new" nonetheless suggests that Article 39.3 does not grant protection to "existing chemical
entities that have been reformulated or sold for a new indication." Robert Weissman, Data
Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151, 166 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING
HEALTH].
42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
43. See CORREA, supra note 10, at 377 ("[T]he submission of data must be necessary to
obtain approval. This means that data voluntarily submitted by an applicant, or in excess of
those required for approval, are not subject to protection.").
44. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3; see also CORREA, supra note 10, at 379
("The requirement of a 'considerable effort' suggests that national authorities may request
the applicant to prove that the information for which protection is sought is the result of
such effort."); GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 428 ("In many cases (e.g. clinical trials), there will
be no doubt as to the sufficiency of the efforts necessary to generate the data.").
45. See Council Directive 1996/9, art. 7(1), 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC) (offering sui generis
protection to databases that are created as a result of "a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the [database] contents"); see also CORREA, supra
note 10, at 380 ("Quite obviously, the proponents of th[e] formulation [requiring a 'consider-
able effort'] aimed at the protection of the investment made in producing the test data.").
46. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
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a reasonable period of time after their submission."4 7 If the submitted
data are to be disclosed, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires
WTO members to meet one of the following two conditions. First, the
disclosure is permitted if it is "necessary to protect the public."4 8 This
necessity requirement is similar to what is found in Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.49 Second, WTO members
may disclose the submitted data if "steps [have been] taken to ensure
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use."0 These
protective steps help fulfill the primary objective of the first sentence
of Article 39.3.
Finally, for either the first or second sentence of Article 39.3, the
TRIPS Agreement does not lay down any standard regarding the du-
ration of protection." The lack of such standard stands in sharp con-
trast to the language found in NAFTA and other TRIPS-plus bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral agreements. Article 1711.6 of NAFTA explic-
itly states:
[A] reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five years
from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person
that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking
47. NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1711.6.
48. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3; see also CORREA, supra note 10, at 380
("According to the interpretation of [the 'necessity test'] in other contexts of GATT/WTO
rules, deference should be given to Members to determine when such necessity arises, but
the Member invoking it will bear the burden of proof, an often difficult task.").
49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 188; see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceu-
ticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 443, 450-52 (2004) (discussing the necessity requirement in
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement). As a WTO document explained:
Necessity tests establish the WTO consistency of a measure based on whether
the measure is "necessary" to achieve certain policy objectives. These tests reflect
the balance in WTO agreements between two important goals: preserving the
freedom of Members to set and achieve regulatory objectives through measures
of their own choosing, and discouraging Members from adopting or maintaining
measures that unduly restrict trade. Necessity tests typically achieve this bal-
ance by requiring that measures, which restrict trade in some way (including by
violating obligations of an agreement) are permissible only if they are "neces-
sary" to achieve the Member's policy objective. In so doing, the necessity tests
confirm the right of Members to regulate and to pursue their policy objectives.
World Trade Organization, Note by the Secretariat: "Necessity Tests" in the WTO, ¶ 4, WTO
Doc. S/WPDR/W/27 (Dec. 2, 2003).
50. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
51. See id. (refraining from specifying the duration of protection); see also CORREA, su-
pra note 10, at 380 ("Article 39.3 aims to preserve the confidentiality of the information sub-
mitted for marketing approval without any time limit. There is no indication in the provision
about the duration of the obligation, certainly a weak point in the text."); GERVAIS, supra
note 2, at 424 ("The [TRIPS] Agreement does not specify a time period.").
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account of the nature of the data and the person's efforts and ex-
penditures in producing them.52
As the next Section will show, the NAFTA-like standard-for a
reasonable time, generally no less than five years"-was included in
the 1990 Brussels draft of the TRIPS Agreement but was later re-
moved as part of a compromise between developed and developing
countries.53 Commentators have also criticized the arbitrariness of the
five-year period.5 4 As Aaron Fellmeth observed:
Five years of data exclusivity may not be enough to compensate the
drug developer adequately for products requiring the most complex
and extensive testing (which is why most European states grant ten
years of exclusivity), while five years may be excessive for the
straightforward testing associated with the most profitable drugs
(which means that the harm caused by the European standard is
doubly egregious in those situations). A predetermined, uniform mo-
nopoly period is a very blunt policy instrument because it treats all
drug marketing approval efforts alike when, in fact, they may vary
significantly.5 5
B. Contestation56
Notwithstanding the carefully drafted language in Article 39.3, the
provision does not include all of the language demanded by developed
countries and their pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries. To
these countries, greater protection of undisclosed test or other data is
important because it would provide additional incentives for R&D
while increasing the countries' competitive and comparative ad-
vantage.57 Nevertheless, commentators have questioned the need for
52. NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1711.6.
53. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 525.
54. See Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 478 (noting that "the five-year period [in NAFTA] is
entirely arbitrary").
55. Id. at 478-79.
56. This Section features materials expanded from Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note
11, at 23-26.
57. As I noted in an earlier article:
As the pharmaceutical industry has claimed, "the development and bringing to
market of a new drug requires the originator to conduct extensive chemical,
pharmacological, toxicological and clinical research and testing, at n average
cost of US$800 million, and taking 10 to 15 years to complete." Because of the
high costs of data collection and the large amount of time involved, additional
protection, other than what pharmaceutical manufacturers already received un-
der the patent system, is necessary to protect their investment. Such protection
would also prevent third parties, in particular generic competitors, from free rid-
ing on the originator's efforts in collecting data during clinical trials. Viewed in
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such protection.8 For countries without a strong pharmaceutical or ag-
rochemical industry, greater protection of such data could be highly det-
rimental. In the case of pharmaceutical products, for example, greater
protection of undisclosed test or other data would increase healthcare
costs, reduce access to medicines, and delay market entry of generic
drugs.9 Such protection would not only jeopardize public health6 0-at
this light, data exclusivity laws are less important as a means to generate incen-
tives than for its ability to effectively erect a market entry barrier that extends
the originator's limited monopolies.
Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777, 784 (2010)
[hereinafter Yu, Political Economy] (footnote omitted) (quoting INT'L FED'N OF PHARM.
MFRS. & AsS'NS, A REVIEW OF EXISTING DATA EXCLUSIVITY LEGISLATION IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES 3 (4th rev. ed. 2005)); see also Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals,
3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 69 (2002) ("The rationale for [the data] exclusivity model is to permit
the originator of data to recover the investments made for his development. The underlying
assumption is that, without such protection, private firms would have no incentive to bear
the considerable costs of producing the required data."); Skillington & Solovy, supra note 37,
at 12-15 (discussing the benefits of providing protection to undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceuticals).
58. As Srividhya Ragavan declared:
Th[e] logic [that the first drug applicant needs incentives to conduct clinical tri-
als] stands on shaky grounds considering that [this] applicant typically seeks
patent protection which, if successful, leads to monopoly profits during the stat-
utory period of exclusivity meant to recoup research and other expenses. Clinical
trials are conducted to determine whether the innovated [new chemical entity],
for which a patent is filed, is safe to be marketed as a drug. Conducting clinical
trials is therefore a part of the risk that innovator companies undertake in order
to gain the enormous market benefits that come with patent protection.
Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 41, at 250-51.
59. As I noted in an earlier article:
If pharmaceuticals become readily available at the end of the patent term, it will
be inhumane to delay the entry of competitive drugs, whether on-patent or ge-
neric. Such delay, along with the reduced price competition, is likely to prolong,
or even exacerbate, the massive public health crises in less developed countries.
Yu, Political Economy, supra note 57, at 785.
60. As Aaron Fellmeth observed:
[T]here is the question of whether disclosure and nonexclusivity practices endan-
ger public health. Disclosure of marketing approval data honors the public's in-
terest in being informed about the safety and effectiveness of an approved drug
and allows independent observers, such as academics and public interest groups,
to conduct further testing and to verify or dispute the accuracy and impartiality
of the data submitted by the registrant. It is sometimes observed that drug de-
velopers have an incentive to suppress unfavorable results from their drug test-
ing or to exaggerate their efficacy findings. The lack of access to testing data
seriously impedes third parties from uncovering bias, inaccurate or incomplete
results, and false claims based on that data. The public may thereby be de-
frauded and public health exposed to unnecessary danger. By refusing to disclose
drug testing information, the drug regulatory authority may prevent the discov-
ery of undetected side effects, dangers, counterindications, or even the inefficacy
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both the domestic and global levels61-but it would also raise ethical
questions about unnecessary or duplicative testing.62
To a large extent, the specific language chosen for Article 39.3 re-
flects the difficult compromise struck between developed and develop-
ing countries.63 During the TRIPS negotiations, two areas were highly
of an approved drug. Whether such independent assessment is "necessary to pro-
tect the public" may be arguable in any given instance, but disclosure is certainly
more helpful to that end than nondisclosure.
Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 475-76 (footnotes omitted); see also Christine D. Galbraith, Dying
to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MIss. L.J.
705, 721-35 (2009) (discussing pharmaceuticals-related controversies involving allegations
of suppression or misrepresentation of clinical trial data); Yu, Political Economy, supra note
57, at 786 ("In countries suffering from rampant corruption and a lack of government trans-
parency, the public availability of these data and the possibility of using them to conduct
independent evaluation are likely to be very important.").
61. See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 1563, 1627-30 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Virotech Patents] (discussing how a public health
issue in a developing country can be transformed into a global security issue).
62. As Professor Fellmeth declared:
[D]uplicative testing is worse than wasteful-it is unethical. Animal testing of
drugs causes the suffering and death of many millions of animals every year.
Duplicative research caused by lack of access to confidential marketing approval
data increases the number of animals unnecessarily subjected to testing. It may
also subject humans to suffering in the form of side effects or prolonged uname-
liorated symptoms where some indications of the drug, though known to the drug
regulatory authority by virtue of a prior registration for the drug, remain un-
known to the subsequent applicant.
Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 474 (footnote omitted); see also Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test
Data for Pharmaceutical nd Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade Agreements [herein-
after Correa, Protecting Test Data], in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 41, at 81, 93 (noting
the negative ethical implications of unnecessary duplication of preclinical and clinical trials);
NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 605 (3d ed. 2010) (" [N]ot
only is repetition of tests a waste of scarce resources, but also, some tests should not be
repeated at all, because they put at risk the lives and cause the suffering of animals and
humans. Repetition of those tests is therefore more than wasteful: it is unethical.");
Srividhya Ragavan, The (Re)Newed Barrier to Access to Medication: Data Exclusivity, 51
AKRON L. REV. 1163, 1189 (2017) [hereinafter Ragavan, (Re)Newed Barrier] ("Clinical trials
are costly not just financially but also in terms of the patient suffering. . . . [T]he adminis-
tering of the drug as part of the trial to wrong patient groups can lead to detrimental side
effects."); Yu, Political Economy, supra note 57, at 785 (noting that it is "wasteful and highly
undesirable to require duplicative testing in countries that have very limited economic re-
sources," and that it is "immoral to require the use of human subjects and animals to retest
drugs that are considered bioequivalent to those that have already been approved for the
market").
63. As Professor Correa recalled:
[I]n its starting positions in the TRIPS negotiations, developing countries re-
jected any form of protection for know-how under the Agreement. At the other
extreme, proposals were made by some industrialized countries in order to es-
tablish a minimum period of exclusive protection (five years for pharmaceuticals)
for the protection of the tests and data submitted for marketing approval. The
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contested and eventually paved the way for the establishment of new
international norms through TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plu-
rilateral agreements. The first area concerns whether regulatory au-
thorities can rely on the originator's previously submitted test or other
data when determining whether to grant marketing approval of follow-
on pharmaceutical and agrochemical products.64 Such reliance occurs
when these authorities approve new products based on evidence pro-
vided by bioequivalence studies. 65 To prevent follow-on developers
from free riding on the originator's submitted data, Article 1711.6 of
NAFTA creates a separate obligation for prohibiting data reliance:
Each Party shall provide that for data. . . that are submitted to the
Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person
other than the person that submitted them may, without the latter's
permission, rely on such data in support of an application for prod-
uct approval during a reasonable period of time after their submis-
sion. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally mean not
less than five years from the date on which the Party granted ap-
proval to the person that produced the data for approval to market
its product, taking account of the nature of the data and the person's
text in the Agreement represents a compromise that leaves considerable room
for implementation at the national level.
CORREA, supra note 10, at 376.
64. See id. at 381 ("One of the crucial interpretative issues in Article 39.3 is whether
the reliance by a national authority on data submitted by one company (the'originator')[,] to
evaluate a subsequent application by another company (a 'follower'), constitutes an 'unfair
commercial use' of the information."); GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 428 ("The practice of generic
drug manufacturers who rely on the fact that a pharmaceutical product is approved and who
only have to show the bio-equivalence of their own product could come under scrutiny, alt-
hough some national courts have taken the view that such reliance (on alleged bio-equiva-
lency) is not 'use'.").
65. As the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act stated:
A drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if-
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant differ-
ence from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered
at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses; or
(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a significant difference
from the extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same
molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
in either a single dose or multiple doses and the difference from the listed drug
in the rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is reflected in its proposed
labeling, is not essential to the attainment of effective body drug concentrations
on chronic use, and is considered medically insignificant for the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355()(8)(B) (2018); see also Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug
Manufacturing Capacities: A Solution for Developing Countries?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra note 41, at 227, 234 (discussing bioequivalence studies for anti-hypertensive and anti-
inflammatory drugs in Colombia).
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efforts and expenditures in producing them. Subject to this provi-
sion, there shall be no limitation on any Party to implement abbre-
viated approval procedures for such products on the basis of bioe-
quivalence and bioavailability studies.6 6
Unlike NAFTA, the TRIPS Agreement does not include explicit lan-
guage mentioning data reliance.67 When the TRIPS negotiators met in
Brussels in December 1990, that draft contained the following brack-
eted language:
4A PARTIES, when requiring, as a condition of approving
the marketing of new pharmaceutical products . .. ,the submission
of undisclosed test or other data, the originator of which involves a
considerable effort, shall [protect such data against unfair commer-
cial use. Unless the person submitting the information agrees, the
data may not be relied upon for the approval of competing products
for a reasonable time, generally no less than five years, commensu-
rate with the efforts involved in the origination of the data, their
nature, and the expenditure involved in their preparation. In addi-
tion, PARTIES shall] protect such data against disclosure, except
where necessary to protect the public.68
This NAFTA-inspired bracketed language did not make it to the final
text of the TRIPS Agreement.6 9
Drawing on this important piece of negotiating history, and utiliz-
ing an interpretive approach endorsed by the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,70 one can fairly state that the TRIPS negotiating
parties did not achieve consensus over the data reliance issue. In-
deed, the removal of the Brussels draft language strongly supports the
view that the TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit regulatory authori-
ties from relying on previously submitted test or other data. As Jerome
Reichman declared emphatically:
To ignore the clear evolution of the text in favour of quasi-exclusive
rights in regulatory data, in a form that was proposed but ultimately
excised from the 1994 Final Act, would in effect amount to imposing
66. NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1711.6.
67. Compare id., with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
68. TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 525.
69. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
70. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("[I]ncluding the prepara-
tory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion" as "supplementary means
of interpretation").
71. For two very different accounts concerning the negotiation of Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement, compare Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 454-60, with Skillington & Solovy,
supra note 37, at 15-2 1.
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unbargained-for trade concessions beyond what was agreed in
TRIPS without any legal foundation whatsoever.7 2
Moreover, the use of bioequivalence studies to grant marketing ap-
provals does not always require the use or disclosure of previously sub-
mitted test or other data. As Professor Reichman continued:
[I]t is not the confidential data themselves that are being unfairly
used, even if a first comer is compelled to submit them in order to
meet health and safety requirements. It is the health and safety
outcome to which the data lead that is being used (a matter of public
record) . . ..
Although Professor Reichman made this observation in the mid-
2000s, it is particularly relevant to today's emerging big-data environ-
ment, which Section IV.A further discusses. In this new technological
environment, what is highly valuable are the collected test data and
their ability to provide a large and comprehensive dataset7 4-not so
much the specific health and safety outcomes proven by those data.
Indeed, any follow-on developers seeking to use or reuse these data in
a big-data environment will have to either generate the test data them-
selves or secure a license to use the originators' data. Having the spe-
cific health and safety outcomes alone will not meet their needs.
As if these issues were not complicated enough, many jurisdictions
still do not require the submission of test data to secure the marketing
approval of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products. As Carlos Cor-
rea observed, in these jurisdictions, "in order to obtain the registration
of a similar product it was sufficient to prove that it had been approved
72. Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trial
Data: From Private to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 41, at 133, 140
[hereinafter Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data]; see also Public Citizen, Data Exclu-
sivity in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 2, https://www.citizen.org/
system/files/case-documents/rcep- data -exclusivity_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6JA-UNPB]
("The TRIPS drafters' refusal to adopt the NAFTA provision is one of several factors demon-
strating their intention to provide for some level of data protection, but not data exclusivity,
in TRIPS."). By contrast, Jacques Gorlin, who directed an ad hoc coalition of major U.S. cor-
porations that pushed for the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement, has subscribed to a
diametrically opposed view:
United States negotiators agreed to drop the non-reliance language, because
they viewed the phrase as no more than "belts and suspenders", that is, the ac-
cepted definition at the time of "protection against unfair commercial use" in-
cluded non-reliance for a fixed period of time for new chemical entities and the
second phrase was, therefore, not needed.
JACQUES J. GORLIN, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE
WTO TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 48 (1999).
73. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data, supra note 72, at 142.
74. See VIKTOR 1VIAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK AND THINK 19-31, 98-122 (2014) (noting the
importance of large and comprehensive datasets in the big-data environment).
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or commercialized in a foreign country." Because the relevant test
data are not submitted "as a condition of approving the marketing of'
the regulated products,7 6 Article 39.3 does not apply.7
The second, highly contentious area during the TRIPS negotiations,
which the final text of Article 39.3 seems to have settled, relates to the
requirement that WTO members introduce a data exclusivity regime.
Commentators, myself included, have noted ad nauseum how data ex-
clusivity is a TRIPS-plus demand that has gone beyond the WTO re-
quirements.8 Article 39.3 introduces two obligations: one "against un-
fair commercial use" and the other "against disclosure."9 There is no
additional obligation to provide exclusive rights in undisclosed test or
other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products.
Thus far, developed countries and their pharmaceutical and agro-
chemical industries have taken the position that data exclusivity is
necessary to provide effective protections for undisclosed test or other
data. As Professor Correa observed:
Despite the fact that Article 39.3 does not provide for the granting
of exclusive rights, research-based industry and the governments of
some developed countries have argued that investment made for de-
veloping test data can only be ensured if a minimum period (eg five
75. CORREA, supra note 10, at 376-77.
76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
77. See CORREA, supra note 10, at 377 (" [I]f a Member country opts not to require those
data, such as when the national authority relies on the marketing approval conferred in a
foreign country, Article 39.3 does not apply.").
78. See id. at 391 ("The wording, context, and purpose of ... [Article 39.3] does not allow
to conclude that the required protection can only be implemented on the basis of an exclusiv-
ity period of protection."); COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 50 (2002) ("TRIPS does not require the imposition of
data exclusivity, as such, on these test data, only protection against unfair commercial use.");
WATAL, supra note 11, at 199 (" [I]n the TRIPS text there is no clear obligation not to rely on
the test data for the second or subsequent applicants nor a fixed duration of market exclu-
sivity, failing which the first registrant is assured reasonable compensation. This is a clear
contrast to the corresponding provisions in NAFTA. .. ." (footnote omitted)); Fellmeth, supra
note 49, at 455 ("[T]he rejection of the U.S. and [European Community] proposals proves
that negotiators did not agree upon an unalloyed obligation to ensure data exclusivity under
any of the proposed terms."); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at
868 (listing data exclusivity as a TRIPS-extra provision); Public Citizen, supra note 72, at 2
(noting that Article 39.3 "does not require 'data exclusivity' ").
79. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3; see also CORREA, supra note 10, at 391
("[The] main purpose [of Article 39.3] is not to prevent the commercial use of [test] data by
governments, but the use thereof by competitors."); WATAL, supra note 11, at 204 ("[A] rea-
sonable interpretation [of Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement] would be that the obligation
on the authorities would be to keep the test data secret and to prohibit others from accessing
this test data for unfair commercial use, such as sale to rival firms.").
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years for pharmaceuticals, ten years for agrochemicals) of exclusiv-
ity is granted.o
Likewise, the European Commission declared:
In theory, any country maintaining an effective system to implement
obligations under [Article] 39.3, even if different from non-reliance
over time, would not be in breach of its TRIPs obligations, but we
are not aware of many alternatives and it is clear that what the
TRIPs-negotiators had in mind was data exclusivity over a certain
period of time.81
Article 39.1 specifically requires WTO members to "ensur[e] effec-
tive protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis
of the Paris Convention (1967)."82 When the obligations of Article 39.1
and 39.3 are linked together-as suggested by the italicized language
advanced by the European Commission-one could make an argument
that WTO members are required to introduce a data exclusivity regime
to protect undisclosed test or other data so as to ensure effective pro-
tection in this area.83
Nevertheless, it is difficult to reconcile this argument with both the
ordinary meaning of Article 39.3 and its negotiating history, including
the highly influential 1990 Brussels draft. The claim of effective pro-
tection is greatly weakened by the TRIPS Agreement's failure to define
the term "effective." 84 As if this ambiguity were not challenging
enough, that term could also be interpreted in light of the objectives
and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement5
80. CORREA, supra note 10, at 374.
81. EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 32, at 21.
82. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.1.
83. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 32, at 21 (noting the limited alternatives to pro-
vide "an effective system to implement obligations under [Article] 39.3" without introducing
a data exclusivity regime); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.1 (requiring WTO
members to "ensur[e] effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article
10bis of the Paris Convention").
84. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty in Post- WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 927 (2006) ("Although the TRIPs Agreement
stipulates that each WTO member state needs to provide effective intellectual property en-
forcement, it does not define what constitutes 'effective' protection.").
85. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 7-8; see also J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS
Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 461 (2000) (suggesting that Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement
may provide "a basis for seeking waivers to meet unforeseen conditions of hardship"); Peter
K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HouS. L. REV. 979, 1018-
46 (2009) (discussing the different ways Articles 7 and 8 can be used to facilitate a more
flexible interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement).
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and the technology transfer commitment provided in Article 66.86 All
in all, it is doubtful that the WTO requires its members to introduce a
data exclusivity regime to offer effective protection under Article 39.3,
unless the term "effective" is defined from the perspective of the phar-
maceutical and agrochemical industries.
Another plausible, and more convincing, argument concerns the in-
terpretation of the term "unfair commercial use." The validity of this
argument likely varies according to one's perspective. Some WTO
members, policymakers, and commentators take the position that re-
liance is per se unfair commercial use 87 as such reliance allows the
86. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66 (requiring developed countries to pro-
vide incentives for their businesses and institutions to help "create a sound and viable tech-
nological base" in least developed countries by promoting and encouraging transfer of tech-
nology). As Paul Heald advocated:
[P]rotection should further "public policy objectives ... including developmental
and technological objectives . . . [and enable the least developed members] to
create a sound and viable technological base." It should also "contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare." These
objectives hardly dictate a narrow set of . . . options to developing countries.
Moreover, one could interpret "effective" purely in terms of economic incentives:
A member must provide a reward adequate to stimulate . . . successful research
and development ....
Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion andAsymmetry
in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REv. 249, 286 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
87. As the European Commission noted:
[T]he only way to guarantee that no "unfair commercial use" within the meaning
of Article 39.3 shall be made is to provide that regulatory authorities should not
rely on these data for a reasonable period of time, the determination of what is a
reasonable period of time being left to the discretion of the Members.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 32, at 19. Antony Taubman, who now directs the WTO In-
tellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, concurred:
Competitors' commercial use of or benefit from regulatory data should be consid-
ered unfair and fit to be legally suppressed if it is likely systematically to deter
submission and future production of such data: when the prospect of a competi-
tor's immediate use of or benefit from the data is sufficient to render it irrational
or unprofitable to generate the data initially, on the part of the originating firm,
or when any competitor's use or benefit from test data that would, if systemati-
cally applied, deter future submissions.
Antony Taubman, Unfair Competition and the Financing of Public-Knowledge Goods: The
Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 591, 606 (2008); see also DE
CARVALHO, supra note 62, at 616 ("The whole idea of Article 39.3 is to prohibit parasitic
behaviour or free riding. Any measures, such as reliance on bio-equivalence tests or other
abridged procedures, that alleviate the subsequent registrant from obligations that have
been imposed on the first registrant should be deemed as such."); Skillington & Solovy, supra
note 37, at 33 (" [I]t is likely that a [WTO] panel would find a Member to be inconsistent with
TRIPS Article 39.3 unless that Member provided some form of protection against unfair com-
mercial use that differed from protection against disclosure.").
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originator's competitors to acquire a commercial advantage. Professor
Correa elaborated this line of argument as follows:
[E]ven when neither the authority nor the competitor actually "use"
the data without the originator's authorization (for instance, when
the approval is given without any re-examination of the data) such
unfair use might arise. In the complaint that the US made against
Australia [via an investigation under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act], for instance, the US argued that relying on the innovator's
data allowed free-riding by generic drug companies on the innovator
company's investment in developing the test data and thus puts the
innovator company at a competitive disadvantage ... The US claims
that Article 39 para (3) means that generic companies are not al-
lowed to derive commercial benefit from the innovator's test data.8 8
"Commercial advantage" has indeed been a term that the United
States has repeatedly pushed for inclusion in TRIPS-plus bilateral, re-
gional, and plurilateral agreements. Article 23.1 of Anti-Counterfeit-
ing Trade Agreement (ACTA), 8 9 for example, sought to increase the
criminal enforcement obligation by redefining the term "commercial
scale" as used in Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement.90 This provision
declares: "acts carried out on a commercial scale include at least those
carried out as commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or
commercial advantage."91 Article 18.77 of the TPP Agreement, which
covers criminal procedures and penalties, further provides:
In respect of wilful copyright or related rights piracy, "on a commer-
cial scale" includes at least:
(a) acts carried out for commercial advantage or financial gain;
and
88. CORREA, supra note 10, at 385; see also Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 456-57 (discuss-
ing the Section 301 investigation conducted by the United States Trade Representative).
89. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M.
243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
90. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 61 ("Members shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale."). The term was particularly problematic in China-
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, when the
WTO panel found that the United States failed to provide sufficient evidence to "demonstrate
what constituted'a commercial scale' in the specific situation of China's marketplace." Panel
Report, China Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights ¶ 7.614, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009). For the Author's discussions
of the TRIPS criminal enforcement obligation in relation to this WTO dispute, see generally
Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through the TRIPS Agreement,
in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 286 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Devel-
oping Countries, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727, 731-34 (2011); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS En-
forcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1056-69, 1083-90 (2011).
91. ACTA, supra note 89, art. 23.1.
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(b) significant acts, not carried out for commercial advantage or
financial gain, that have a substantial prejudicial impact on the in-
terests of the copyright or related rights holder in relation to the
marketplace.92
Apart from data reliance and data exclusivity-two highly divisive
issues at the TRIPS negotiations-the contestations in the negotiation
process and the various compromises struck between developed and de-
veloping countries have generated four unanswered questions. These
questions have raised concerns among policymakers in developing coun-
tries and their supporting commentators and NGOs. The questions have
also sparked the development of new norms or clarifications at the bi-
lateral, regional, and plurilateral levels.93 Because many of these ques-
tions relate to pharmaceutical products and implicate public health, the
illustrations below will focus on these products, although one could eas-
ily make analogies to agrochemical products.
The first question concerns whether data exclusivity protections
continue even when the relevant pharmaceutical product is no longer
protected by a patent, such as when that product is in the public do-
main or when the previously granted patent has been subsequently
invalidated.94 As Professor Correa observed:
The issue of protection of data is especially relevant to off-pa-
tent products, since in cases where the product is patented, the
patent holder can, in principle, exclude any competition during the
lifetime of the patent. It is also of particular importance to many
developing countries that had excluded patent protection for phar-
maceuticals until recently. Because of such exclusion, in those
countries there is still a large pool of pharmaceutical or agrochem-
ical products that fall outside any patent rights. Data protection
systems could, if they provided exclusivity, become a partial sub-
stitute for patent protection.9 5
To be sure, the duration of data exclusivity protection is usually
shorter than the term of patent protection. In most circumstances, the
protection of test or other data will expire before the end of the patent
term. While the administrative delay caused by the regulatory ap-
proval process could shorten the effective marketing period of patented
pharmaceutical products to about fourteen years,9 6 that period is still
92. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.77 (footnotes omitted).
93. See discussion infra Part III.
94. See Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 41, at 252-53 (discussing the complica-
tions when the drug is in the public domain or when the granted patent for the drug has
been subsequently invalidated).
95. CORREA, supra note 10, at 377.
96. As Kevin Outterson explained:
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much longer than the usual five-year period of data exclusivity for
these products. Should a product's patent term be extended based on
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984,98 or its equivalents in TRIPS-plus bi-
lateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements,9 9 the product will enjoy
a longer exclusive marketing period.
For pharmaceutical products that patent law no longer protects,
however, data exclusivity law could provide substitutional protection.
Although Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement conditions protection
on the existence of "new chemical entities," it does not require the rel-
evant entities to meet the novelty standard commonly found in patent
law. 00 Instead, the TRIPS Agreement provides WTO members with
wide discretion to set their own standards.o For instance, policymak-
ers and commentators in developed countries have widely considered
The exclusive marketing period is shorter than the 20-year patent term be-
cause several years pass from the patent date until the drug is approved for mar-
keting. By the late 1990s, the U.S. pharmaceutical exclusive marketing period
was approximately 14 years. There is some evidence that the period is longer for
recent antibiotics. For the last two novel antibiotics approved by the [United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)] (Zyvox/linezolid and Cubicin/dap-
tomycin), the exclusive marketing period indicated by the FDA ORANGE BOOK is
14 to 21 years for Zyvox and 13 to 16 years for Cubicin.
Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 72 n.24 (2005) (citing CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES
AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45-48 (1998)) (citations omitted).
97. See NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1711.6 ([A] reasonable period shall normally mean
not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person that
produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account of the nature of the data
and the person's efforts and expenditures in producing them."); TPP Agreement, supra note 12,
art. 18.50 (providing protection "for at least five years from the date of marketing approval of
the new pharmaceutical product in the territory of the Party" (footnote omitted)).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018) (providing a limited extension of the patent term based
on the period during which a pharmaceutical product undergoes regulatory review).
99. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 24, art. 15.9.6; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note
24, art. 17.9.8; U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 24, art. 17.9.8.
100. See CORREA, supra note 10, at 378 ("Presumably [the definition of 'new'] does not
impose a patent standard of novelty, but nothing prevents a Member country from assimi-
lating the concept of 'new' used in this Article to the one applied under patent law."); TRIPS
RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 530 ("The Agreement does not define what should be
meant by 'new'. Members may apply a concept similar to the one applied under patent law,
or consider that a chemical entity is 'new' if there were no prior application for approval of
the same drug."); Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 41, at 252-54 (discussing the dis-
tinction between the term "new chemical entities" and the "novelty" standard in patent law);
Skillington & Solovy, supra note 37, at 27 ("There is no reason to assume that the term used
in the context of determining patentability would be used identically in provisions for deter-
mining whether test data should be protected.").
101. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 869-70 (discussing
the limitations, flexibilities, and public interest safeguards in the TRIPS Agreement). For
commentaries emphasizing the flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement, see generally
CORREA, supra note 10; TRIPS RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 2.
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the term "new chemical entities" to require only the lack of prior reg-
ulatory approval of the pharmaceutical products at issue.102 The past
decade has also seen the United States and other WTO members ac-
tively utilizing TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agree-
ments to clarify the definition of newness. A case in point is Article
18.52 of the TPP Agreement, which states that "a new pharmaceutical
product means a pharmaceutical product that does not contain a chem-
ical entity that has been previously approved in that Party."103
The second question pertains to the use of compulsory licenses-or,
in TRIPS terms, "[the] use [of a patent] without authorization of the
right holder."104 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement delineates the com-
plex conditions under which these licenses are to be issued for pa-
tented products.1  Article 31bis, which recently entered into force,106
also extends the compulsory licensing arrangement o countries with
insufficient or no drug manufacturing capacity.107 Unlike those two
102. See CORREA, supra note 10, at 378 (" [A] chemical entity may be deemed 'new' if
there were no prior application for approval of the same product in the Member where pro-
tection is sought."); GERVAIS, supra note 2, at 427 (noting that a "practical approach" could
be to determine eligibility based on the fact that "a chemical entity is new in the WTO Mem-
ber concerned, in the sense that it has not been previously submitted for regulatory approval
of the type considered under this article"); Skillington & Solovy, supra note 37, at 25-28
(discussing the meaning of the term "new chemical entities"). As stated in the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration regulations:
If a drug product that contains a new chemical entity was approved... in [a new
drug application] submitted under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, no person may submit a 505(b)(2) application or [abbreviated new
drug application] under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act for a drug product that contains the same active moiety as in the new chem-
ical entity for a period of 5 years from the date of approval of the first approved
[new drug application], except that the 505(b)(2) application or [abbreviated new
drug application] may be submitted after 4 years if it contains a certification
of patent invalidity or noninfringement described in § 314.50(i)(1)(i)(A)(4)
or § 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).
21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2018); see also Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions
for New Drug Product Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069962.htm [ht ps://perma.cc/
J4D3-G7NC] ("A new chemical entity means a drug that contains no active moiety that has
been approved by FDA in any other application submitted under section 505(b) of the [Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic] Act.").
103. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.52 (footnote omitted).
104. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31.
105. See id. (delineating these conditions).
106. The amendment was adopted in January 2017 after it had been opened for ratifica-
tion for more than a decade. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO IP Rules Amended to
Ease Poor Countries' Access to Affordable Medicines (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/newsl7_e/trip_23janl7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BUT5-XH36].
107. See General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/641
(Dec. 8, 2005) (providing the text of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Yu, The
DATA EXCLUSIVITIES
provisions, however, Article 39.3 is not subject to the compulsory li-
censing arrangement provided in the TRIPS Agreement.108 Indeed, if
one goes back to the composite text Lars Anell, the chair of the TRIPS
Negotiating Group,09 advanced in his July 23, 1990 report, that text
includes a distinct sentence declaring that "[t]here shall be no compul-
sory licensing of proprietary information."1 0 The lack of coverage for
compulsory licensing arrangements, therefore, has sparked an inter-
esting debate concerning whether WTO members can utilize the test
or other data submitted to regulatory authorities for the purposes of
granting marketing approval of pharmaceutical products that have
been, or are to be, issued under compulsory licenses.' Also debatable
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 872-86 (tracing the development of Ar-
ticle 3 Ibis of the TRIPS Agreement).
108. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 31, with id. art. 39.3.
109. See Lars Anell, Foreword to the First Edition, in GERVAIS, supra note 2, at ix (re-
counting the TRIPS negotiations from the vantage point of the chair of the TRIPS Negotiat-
ing Group); Lars Anell, Keynote Speech at the TRIPS Symposium, 26 February 2015, in THE
MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS 365 (Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) [hereinafter MAKING
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT] (reminiscing about the TRIPS negotiations at the twentieth an-
niversary of the TRIPS Agreement).
110. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, In-
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Chairman's Report to the GNG [General Negotiating
Group]: Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, at 23, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76
(July 23, 1990).
111. Compare ANGELINA SNODGRASS GODOY, OF MEDICINES AND MARKETS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE FREE TRADE ERA 74 (2013) (While
Guatemala could choose to issue a compulsory license for [a drug], compulsory licenses are
intended to loosen patents; their applicability to test data has not yet been tested anywhere
in the world."), with CORREA, supra note 10, at 374 ("Under [the exceptions provided in Ar-
ticle 39.3], disclosure would be permissible . . . to allow a compulsory licensee to obtain a
marketing approval, particularly when the licence is aimed at remedying anti-competitive
practices or at satisfying public health needs."). See also Correa, Protecting Test Data, supra
note 62, at 94 ('Since a compulsory licence or government use only permits the use of the
patent, it may be necessary to waive the rights conferred under data exclusivity to obtain
marketing approval of the relevant [pharmaceutical] product."); DE CARVALHO, supra note
62, at 649 ("The fact that Article 39.3 does not refer to compulsory licenses does not mean
that it prohibits them. When TRIPS negotiators wished to prohibit compulsory licenses of
intellectual property rights, they did so explicitly, as in Article 21."); Weissman, supra note
41, at 168-74 (discussing the compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products and the de-
velopment of a compulsory licensing system for registration data); Ellen F.M. 't Hoen et al.,
Data Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing to Promote Generic Medicines in the
European Union: A Proposal for Greater Coherence in European Pharmaceutical Legislation,
10 J. PHARMACEUTICAL POL'Y & PRAC. 19, at 6 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ar-
ticles/PMC5490222/ [https://perma.cc/N3AZ-PV47] ("The right of governments to grant com-
pulsory licences, including for public non-commercial use, is acknowledged in international
law, including in TRIPS. Effective use of such licences requires a waiver of data exclusivity
for the approval and marketing of licensed generic medicines."); Ragavan, (Re)Newed Bar-
rier, supra note 62, at 1190 ("[T]he 'public interest' exception outlined in Article 39 can be
used to create statutory exceptions in national legislations to the use of the data for approv-
ing a competitor's application to supply the market.").
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is the possibility for waiving data exclusivity protection upon the issu-
ance of such licenses.112
The third question regards the meaning of "undisclosed" infor-
mation. Based on its ordinary meaning, the term does not include "in-
formation that is already public (eg, because it has been published in
scientific journals or by another national health authority)." 113 Alt-
hough this issue was not significantly important in the past, it will
likely become more important in the future, especially with the grow-
ing push for the sharing of test or other data under open-access ar-
rangements.114 For example, the European Medicines Agency adopted
a new publication policy that requires the agency to proactively pub-
lish test data that have been submitted to the agency after January 1,
2015 for initial marketing authorization."' The agency also publishes
data that have been submitted after July 1, 2015 as part of an appli-
cation for a new indication or line extension.116 In addition, the U.N.
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines called on
governments to
require that the unidentified data on all completed and discontinued
clinical trials be made publicly available in an easily searchable public
register established and operated by existing mechanisms such as the
[World Health Organization] Clinical Trials Registry Platform, clinical-
trials.gov or in peer reviewed publications, regardless of whether their
results are positive, negative, neutral or inconclusive."'
112. See Correa, Protecting Test Data, supra note 62, at 94 (discussing the need "to waive
the rights conferred under data exclusivity to obtain marketing approval of the relevant
[pharmaceutical] product"); DE CARVALHO, supra note 62, at 650-51 (listing the provisions
on compulsory licenses of test data in Brazilian and Saudi Arabian legislation); 't Hoen et
al., supra note 111, at 4-5 (discussing data exclusivity waivers in Chilean, Colombian, and
Malaysian legislation); Weissman, supra note 41, at 168-70 (discussing a data exclusivity
waiver in cases of compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products).
113. CORREA, supra note 10, at 378; see also Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 41,
at 251 ("Article 39 leaves ... room to determine the question of whether data undisclosed in
one part of the world should be considered undisclosed in another part of the world.").
114. See generally COMM. ON STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF CLINICAL TRIAL
DATA, INST. OF MED., SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING
RISK (2015) (providing a detailed report outlining the benefits, risks, and challenges of shar-
ing clinical trial data).
115. See European Medicines Agency, European Medicines Agency Policy on Publication
of Clinical Data for Medicinal Products for Human Use, EMA/240810/2013 (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/documentlibrary/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5LG-EHW5]; see also Daria Kim, Enabling Access to Clinical Trial Data:
When Is Unfair Use Fair, 14 CHI-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 521 (2015) (discussing whether the
disclosure of clinical trial data by the European Medicines Agency for experimental use is
consistent with Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement).
116. See European Medicines Agency, supra note 115.
117. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDS., PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 37 (2016).
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Trudo Lemmens and Candice Telfer have also used the right to
health to justify the disclosure of test or other data for pharmaceuti-
cal products. 118
The final question involves the interplay,"9 and often the overlap,120
between the different forms of intellectual property rights for pharma-
ceutical products. While Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement offers
only limited protection to undisclosed test and other data, TRIPS-plus
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements have called for not
only market or data exclusivity for test or other data for pharmaceuti-
cal and agrochemical products but also for a considerable increase in
patent standards, extension of the patent term due to regulatory delay,
protections for new uses (or second indications) of known chemical
compounds, linkage of drug registration to patent status, and
strengthening of enforcement relating to the seizure of in-transit
drugs.12 1 Given the increasing demands for these new protections, pol-
icymakers and commenters are understandably concerned that the
118. See Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to
Health: The Human Rights Case for Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 66
(2012) ("[A]ccess to information about clinical trials, which is a crucial tool for drug and med-
ical device development, ought to be recognized as a fundamental component of the right to
health."). For the Author's earlier discussions of the interplay between intellectual property
and human rights, see generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and
Their Human Rights Threats, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HuMAN RIGHTS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 455 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Prop-
erty, Human Rights and Methodological Reflections, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH (Irene Calboli & Lil Montagnani eds., forthcoming
2019); Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property,
69 SMU L. REV. 37 (2016); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights 2.0, 53 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1375 (2019); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Non-
multilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Nonmultilateral Era]; Peter
K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property In-
terests]; Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights,
23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007).
119. See Yaniv Heled, Patents us. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals-
Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 419, 476-79 (2012) (documenting
the interplay between the patent term and the terms of regulatory exclusivities).
120. See id. at 462 (noting that concurrent protection in biologicals "leads to a waste of
societal resources" and "gives rise to unnecessary and avoidable risks of abuse" (capitaliza-
tion omitted)); Srividhya Ragavan, The Drug Debate: Data Exclusivity Is the New Way to
Delay Generics, 50 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4 (2018) ("[T]he data exclusivity regime can
operate in parallel with the patent regime to add a layer of protection for the clinical trial
data."). For discussions of overlapping rights, see generally ESTELLE DERCLAYE & MATTHIAS
LEISTNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OVERLAPS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2011);
OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 189 (Neil Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer eds.,
2012); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 547 (1997).
121. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 867-69 (discussing
the different types of TRIPS-plus standards). The linkage of drug registration to patent sta-
tus is often discussed alongside the protection of test and other data, due in large part to the
pharmaceutical industry's concurrent demands. For discussions of this linkage, see generally
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simultaneous introduction or adjustment of multiple intellectual prop-
erty standards would lead to overprotection. 122 Some commentators
have also explored the substitutability of the different forms of intel-
lectual property rights.1 23 After all, if the protections for undisclosed
test or other data have already been increased to provide additional
incentives, a country may not need to simultaneously extend the pa-
tent term.124
C. Conflict
To illustrate the significant disagreement between developed and
developing countries at the TRIPS negotiations and the ramifications
of the continued contestations over the appropriate international min-
imum standards in this area, this Section recounts the WTO dispute
between Argentina and the United States over the lack of adequate
Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Pa-
tent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2008); Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in
Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 79, 88-91 (2004).
122. See Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 26 (" [M]any developing countries are
concerned about the impact of the changing standards not only for a single form of intellec-
tual property right, such as the protection of clinical trial data, but also for a combination of
multiple forms of intellectual property rights.").
123. See generally Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399 (2013) (proposing a nonpatent exclu-
sivity system administered by the Food and Drug Administration that offers the incentives
traditionally provided by the patent system); Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New
IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53 (2016) (discussing the rise of "regulatory property" as a new
form of intellectual property); Daniel Gervais, The Patent Option, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 357
(2019) (proposing an extension of the duration of data exclusivity protection in exchange for
not applying for a patent or allowing the patent to lapse); Heled, supra note 119 (questioning
the need for and purpose of having patent rights and statutory exclusivities in biologics);
John R. Thomas, The End of "Patent Medicines"?: Thoughts on the Rise of Regulatory Exclu-
sivities, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39 (2015) (exploring the implications of the pharmaceutical
industry's growing preference for regulatory exclusivities to patent protection).
124. As I noted in an earlier article:
While pharmaceutical manufacturers may still need incentives to obtain mar-
keting approval for their products, most of the marketing costs are already in-
cluded in the total costs that are used to justify stronger patent protection. Un-
less the regulatory authorities in foreign countries require different clinical trials
during the approval process, additional incentives seem to be unnecessary. In-
deed, if data exclusivity laws are to be adopted, one has to wonder whether ex-
isting patent rights need to be curtailed proportionally to reflect the additional
incentives.
Yu, Political Economy, supra note 57, at 784-85; see also Heled, supra note 119, at 461-64
(discussing the undesirable ramifications of providing concurrent protection to biologies us-
ing both patent rights and statutory exclusivities); Yu, The International Enclosure Move-
ment, supra note 5, at 895 ("If additional incentives are provided by the data exclusivity
regime, one has to wonder whether patent protection should be weakened proportionally to
reflect the additional incentives.").
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protection for test and other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical
products. In the twenty-five years of existence of the WTO dispute set-
tlement process, this dispute is the only one involving Article 39.3 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
On May 6, 1999, the United States filed a complaint against Argen-
tina before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.125 This complaint was
initiated following the Clinton Administration's suspension of half of
Argentina's trade benefits under the U.S. Generalized System of Pref-
erences in April 1997.126 In addition to alleging inadequate protection
of pharmaceutical products under the patent system or through exclu-
sive marketing rights,127 the WTO complaint claimed that Argentina
had violated the TRIPS Agreement by repealing a regulation that had
provided ten years of protection for undisclosed test or other data for
agrochemical products.128 As the complaint declared:
Prior to August 1998, the Government of Argentina provided a ten-
year term of protection against unfair commercial use for undis-
closed test data or other data submitted to Argentine regulatory au-
thorities in support of applications for marketing approval for agri-
cultural chemical products. Since the issuance in 1998 of Regulation
440/98, which inter alia revoked earlier regulations, Argentina has
provided no effective protection for such data against unfair com-
mercial use. As a result, Argentina's legal regime appears to be in-
consistent with the obligation in Article 65.5 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment in that changes to its laws, regulations or practice during the
transitional period have resulted in a lesser degree of consistency
with the provisions of Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.129
On May 30, 2000, slightly more than a year later, the United States
filed a second complaint against Argentina alleging a lack of adequate
125. WTO Complaint 1, supra note 23.
126. See Fellmeth, supra note 49, at 457 ("In 1997, ... the Clinton administration with-
drew Argentina's preferential tariff rates granted under the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences, reducing Argentinean imports into the United States by an estimated $260 million.");
see also Dan Molinski, Argentina Protests Tariff Action, J. COM., Apr. 17, 1997, at 3A (report-
ing the suspension).
127. Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in accordance
with [Article 70.8(a)], exclusive marketing rights shall be granted, notwithstand-
ing the provisions of Part VI, for a period of five years after obtaining marketing
approval in that Member or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that
Member, whichever period is shorter, provided that, subsequent o the entry into
force of the WTO Agreement, a patent application has been filed and a patent
granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval obtained
in such other Member.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 70.9.
128. WTO Complaint 1, supra note 23, at 2.
129. Id.
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protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and ag-
rochemical products.130 In addition to select patent provisions in Ar-
gentina, the United States challenged Argentine laws and regulations
that covered such protection-namely, Law 24.766, Regulation 440/98,
and other related measures.131 As the complaint stated, the United
States believed that "Argentina [had] faill[ed] to protect against unfair
commercial use of undisclosed test or other data, submitted as a re-
quirement for market approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical products."13 2
From a standpoint of TRIPS interpretation, this complaint can be
highly important, as it could result in the issuance of a WTO panel
report, and, perhaps, even a follow-up Appellate Body report.133 Article
64 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically requires WTO members to use
the WTO dispute settlement process to settle disputes arising under
the Agreement.13 4 Notwithstanding the potential for a WTO panel to
weigh in on the international obligations provided by Article 39.3 of
the TRIPS Agreement, Argentina and the United States settled the
dispute on May 31, 2002, before the complainant's request for the es-
tablishment of a WTO panel.135
130. WTO Complaint 2, supra note 23.
131. Id. at 1; see also Law No. 24766, Dec. 17, 1996, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/
details/103 [https://perma.cc/P2LD-5BKW] (Arg.); Resolution No. 440/98, July 22, 1998,
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/106 [https://perma.cc/9T7B-RQK9] (Arg.).
132. WTO Complaint 2, supra note 23, at 1.
133. Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing se-
curity and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recog-
nize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401.
134. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64.
135. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina-Patent Protection for Phar-
maceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals and Argentina-Certain
Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WTO Does. WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4
(June 20, 2002) [hereinafter WTO Settlement Notification]; see also CORREA, supra note 10,
at 389 n.54 (noting that the case "was settled without any change in Argentina's legislation
with regard to data protection"). Professor Correa described the aftermath of this dispute:
Argentina did not accept the US claim that exclusive rights should be granted
for test data and maintained its law unchanged. No further action in the frame-
work of the WTO has been taken by [the] US against Argentina, or any other
country that does not recognize data exclusivity. However, the US Office of the
Trade Representative (USTR) has listed, under the Special Section 301 of the
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The mutually agreed upon solutions that the parties transmitted to
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body focused primarily on the resolution
of patent disputes.13 6 Among the disputes resolved were those concern-
ing compulsory licenses, exclusive marketing rights, import re-
strictions, product-by-process patents, burden of proof in patent in-
fringement cases, preliminary injunctions, patentability of micro-or-
ganisms and other subject matter, and transitional patents.137 How-
ever, no solution was offered in relation to the United States' complaint
about Argentina's inadequate protection of undisclosed test and other
data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products. As the notifica-
tion of settlement stated:
The Governments of the United States and Argentina have ex-
pressed their respective points of view on the provisions of Article
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, and have agreed that differences in
interpretations shall be solved under the [Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding] rules. The Parties will continue consultations to assess
the progress of the legislative process of approval of items 4, 5 and
6 of this notification [which cover product-by-process patents, bur-
den of proof in patent infringement cases, and preliminary injunc-
tions], and in the light of this assessment, the United States may
decide to continue consultations or request the establishment of a
panel related to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.
In addition, the Parties agree that should the Dispute Settle-
ment Body adopt recommendations and rulings clarifying the con-
tent of the rights related to undisclosed test data submitted for mar-
keting approval according to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement,
and should Argentinean law be inconsistent with Article 39.3 as
clarified by the above-mentioned recommendations and rulings, Ar-
gentina agrees to submit to the National Congress within one year
an amendment o Argentinean law, as necessary, to put its legisla-
tion in conformity with its obligations under Article 39.3 as clarified
in such recommendations and rulings.138
Although the United States notified the WTO that it might continue
consultations with Argentina or make a later request for the establish-
ment of a panel,13 9 neither actions took place.14 0 As a result, the official
Trade Act, a large number of countries that, according to the USTR, do not confer
adequate (that is, exclusive) protection for test data.
Correa, Protecting Test Data, supra note 62, at 85.
136. WTO Settlement Notification, supra note 135.
137. Id. at 2-5.
138. Id. at 6.
139. Id.
140. As Kenneth Shadlen observed: "The reason why the US dropped the case is not
known with certainty, but it appears to be because it feared that a WTO ruling would favor
Argentina's interpretation of TRIPS, and the precedent set by losing in the multilateral body
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interpretation of Article 39.3 has remained as contested today as the
time of the United States' complaint against Argentina.
III. TRIPS-PLUS DEVELOPMENTS
Immediately after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, developed
countries and their intellectual property industries extolled its many
achievements. As Jacques Gorlin-the director of an ad hoc coalition
of major U.S. corporations that pushed for the establishment of the
TRIPS Agreement 141 -proudly observed, his Intellectual Property
Committee got ninety-five percent of what it wanted.14 2 Notwithstand-
ing this success, intellectual property rights have not been protected
and enforced to the satisfaction of U.S. intellectual property indus-
tries-and likely, their counterparts in other developed countries.1 43
Conscious of this continuous lack of effective protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, the United States and the Euro-
pean Union actively pushed for the negotiation of TRIPS-plus bilateral
and regional trade agreements.
Since the mid-2000s, the United States established free trade
agreements "with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Jordan,
Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, Singapore, and South Korea."1 4 4 In
May 2004, the United States also became a party to the Dominican
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, along with Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
would undermine efforts to secure data exclusivity in other countries." SHADLEN, supra note
23, at 152-53 n. 17.
141. Formed in March 1986, the Intellectual Property Committee brought together top
corporate executives from about a dozen United States-based multinational firms. In addi-
tion to coordinating industry positions on intellectual property policies with the U.S. govern-
ment, the Committee was instrumental in "forging an industry consensus with its Japanese
and European industry counterparts [Keidanren and UNICE (Union of Industrial and Em-
ployers' Confederations of Europe), respectively], who agreed to work on [a trade-based ap-
proach to protecting intellectual property] and pledged to present these views to their re-
spective governments in time for the launching of the Uruguay Round." SELL, supra note 22,
at 106; see also id. at 96-120 (discussing the role of the Intellectual Property Committee in
pushing for the adoption of high intellectual property standards in the TRIPS Agreement).
142. Id. at 115 (citing interview with Jacques Gorlin).
143. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPSandIts Achilles'Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 505 (2011)
[hereinafter Yu, Achilles'Heel] (noting the developed countries' deep dissatisfaction with the
continuous piracy and counterfeiting problems in developing countries and explaining why
the former did not push for stronger international intellectual property enforcement norms
until the mid-2000s).
144. Peter K. Yu, The Non-multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property
Normsetting, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 83, 86 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter Yu, Non-multilateral Approach].
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and Nicaragua.145 Meanwhile, the European Union established eco-
nomic partnership or free trade agreements "with Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, South Africa, South Korea and members of the Carib-
bean Forum (CARIFORUM)."146
All of these nonmultilateral agreements include chapters dedicated
to the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The
primary objective of these chapters is to set high standards for intel-
lectual property protection and enforcement hat go beyond the TRIPS
requirements.147 To a large extent, the justification for TRIPS-plus in-
tellectual property chapters is not that different from the justification
for the TRIPS Agreement in the late 1980s and early 1990s.148 During
the Uruguay Round negotiations, developing countries were repeat-
edly "told to overlook the distasteful aspects of introducing or increas-
ing intellectual property protection and enforcement in exchange for
longer-term economic health."14 9
Out of all the new intellectual property standards introduced
through TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements,
one set of standards that has garnered considerable policy, scholarly,
and media attention concerns the protection of undisclosed test or
other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products. Because
all of these agreements have introduced similar language, this Part
focuses on the three latest regional or plurilateral agreements: the
TPP Agreement, the proposed RCEP Agreement, and the recently
signed USMCA. While such a focus does not show the gradual up-
ward ratchet of international intellectual property standards, a close
145. CAFTA-DR, supra note 24, art. 15.1.3(a); see also Carlos M. Correa, A Model Law
for the Protection of Undisclosed Data, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 370 (Ricardo Mel6ndez-
Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds., 2009) (discussing the protection of undisclosed test or other data
for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products in relation to the Dominican Republic-Central
America Free Trade Agreement).
146. Yu, Non-multilateral Approach, supra note 144, at 86.
147. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Begins TPP Talks
in Australia (Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter TPP Launch Press Release], https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2010/march/ustr-begins-tpp-talks-australia
[https://perma.cc/S6KY-C476] ("Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations offer a unique oppor-
tunity to shape a high-standard, broad-based regional pact. . . . Our . . . negotiators will be
working to set a new standard for 21st century trade pacts."); see also Yu, Thinking About
TPP, supra note 12, at 110-15 (discussing the TPP Agreement as a TRIPS-plus intellectual
property agreement).
148. See supra authorities cited in note 22.
149. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact
on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES
AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); see also Edmund W. Kitch,
The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994) (arguing
that developing countries agreed to stronger intellectual property protection during the
TRIPS negotiations because they found such protection to be in their self-interest).
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analysis of these agreements reveals the latest contestations over the
international minimum standards for protecting undisclosed test or
other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products, as well as
the active-and, for some, highly problematic15 0-developments out-
side the WTO.
A. TPP
The negotiations for the TPP Agreement began in earnest in March
2010.151 Building on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement 152-a quadrilateral agreement involving Brunei Darus-
salam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, known widely as the P4 or
the Pacific 41 53-the TPP negotiations involved Australia, Canada, Ja-
pan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, the United States, and the P4
members. After nearly six years of negotiations, the TPP Agreement
was finally signed in Auckland, New Zealand in February 2016.154 In-
cluded in this agreement is a chapter on intellectual property rights.5
Out of the eighty-three provisions in that chapter, three relate to the
protection of undisclosed test and other data: Article 18.47 (for agro-
chemical products),1 6 Article 18.50 (for pharmaceutical products),15 7
and Article 18.51 (for biologics).5 8
Unlike Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, which protects against
"unfair commercial use" and disclosure, '9 Article 18.47 of the TPP
Agreement requires parties to establish a market exclusivity regime.16 0
Although commentators often describe this regime as "data exclusiv-
ity," the term "market exclusivity" is more accurate because the TPP
150. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 228-230.
151. TPP Launch Press Release, supra note 147.
152. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Brunei-Chile-N.Z.-
Sing., Aug, 2, 2005, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-force/P4/Full-text-
of-P4-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DBA-YFPC].
153. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader Trans-
Pacific Partnership: Implications, Risks and Opportunities, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 401, 403-04 (2009).
154. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ministers' Statement (Feb. 4, 2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/
press-releases/2016/February/TPP-Ministers-Statement [https://perma.cc/WZ3P-Z8Q8].
155. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, ch. 18; see also Emily Michiko Morris, Much Ado
About the TPP's Effect on Pharmaceuticals, 20 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 135 (2017) (dis-
cussing the TPP's potential impact on drug prices and access to healthcare).
156. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.47.
157. Id. art. 18.50.
158. Id. art. 18.51.
159. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
160. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.47.
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regime merely prevents the marketing of a new pharmaceutical or ag-
rochemical product based on the utilization of, or reliance on, previ-
ously submitted test or other data.161 However, the regime does not
grant exclusive rights in the data, nor does it prevent the utilization
of, or reliance on, such data during the exclusivity term. As I noted in
an earlier article:
The distinction between market exclusivity and data exclusivity
is noteworthy.. . . By the time [the exclusivity] term is over, follow-
on . . . developers [of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products]
will still have to spend considerable time pushing their products
through the regulatory process to secure marketing approval. Thus,
a data exclusivity regime will generally provide a longer period of
protection than a market exclusivity regime.162
For agrochemical products, the TPP Agreement grants protection
"for at least 10 years from the date of marketing approval of the
new . . . product in the territory of the Party."163 For pharmaceutical
products, by contrast, the protection lasts "for at least five years from
the date of marketing approval of the new pharmaceutical product in
the territory of the Party."16 4 For the latter, Article 18.50.2 offers addi-
tional protection to new clinical information or molecular variations. 161
Under this provision, TPP partners could provide protection "for a pe-
riod of at least three years with respect to new clinical information
submitted as required in support of a marketing approval of a previ-
ously approved pharmaceutical product covering a new indication, new
161. See Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 27 (expressing preference for the term
"market exclusivity" to the term "data exclusivity"). As Erika Lietzan observed:
Some use "data exclusivity" to refer to statutory prohibitions on submission of
abbreviated applications and "market exclusivity" to refer to statutory prohibi-
tions on approval of abbreviated applications and by extension market entry.
Others use "data exclusivity" to refer to statutory provisions relating to either
approval or submission of abbreviated applications, on the theory that these ap-
plications rely on the data submitted in earlier applications.
Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 103 (2016).
162. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 27. As a document released by Public Cit-
izen explained:
If a drug truly had five years of data exclusivity, the marketing authority would
not be able to consider a generic application for five years, which would, in turn,
provide the innovator another one to three years of market monopoly after the
data exclusivity period expires before a generic could be approved and enter the
market. This is because it takes that long for the marketing authority to analyze
the generic's application and grant it marketing approval.
Public Citizen, supra note 72, at 3.
163. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.47.1 (footnote omitted).
164. Id. art. 18.50.1(a) (footnote omitted).
165. Id. art. 18.50.2(a).
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formulation or new method of administration."166 In the alternative,
they could afford protection "for a period of at least five years to new
pharmaceutical products that contain a chemical entity that has not
been previously approved in that Party."167
Article 18.51, which covers biologics, was among the most contro-
versial provisions toward the end of the TPP negotiations.16 8 Similar
to the provision on pharmaceutical products-that is, chemical drugs,
not biological drugs-this provision requires the establishment of a
market exclusivity regime. 169 Although the United States initially
pushed for twelve years of protection for biologics, 1 70 the TPP negotiat-
ing parties ended up with "at least eight years from the date of first
marketing approval."171 That compromise term would last longer than
the market exclusivity period for chemical drugs, but it would be
shorter than the period for agrochemical products.172 To address the
strong disagreement among the TPP negotiating parties, Article 18.51
allows each party to decide whether to offer market exclusivity for at
least eight years or to offer such exclusivity for at least five years and
then supplement such exclusivity with "other measures" for the re-
maining years.173
Finally, the TPP negotiating parties were conscious of the different
levels of development among the like-minded parties, and that some
166. Id.
167. Id. art. 18.50.2(b) (footnote omitted).
168. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Evolution of Public Health Provisions in Preferential
Trade and Investment Agreements of the United States, in CURRENT ALLIANCES IN
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWMAKING: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF
MEGA-REGIONALS 45, 55 (Pedro Roffe & Xavier Seuba eds., 2017) [hereinafter Abbott, Evo-
lution of Public Health Provisions] (noting that "negotiation of the duration of the biologies
exclusivity period was perhaps the most controversial part of the TPP negotiations"); Burcu
Kilic & Courtney Pine, Decision Time on Biologics Exclusivity: Eight Years Is No Compro-
mise, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 27, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/07/27/decision-
time-on-biologics-exclusivity-eight-years-is-no-compromise/ [https://perma.cc/N265-MEY8]
("As the Trans-Pacific Partnership ... negotiations approach their endgame, biologies exclu-
sivity is still considered 'one of the most difficult outstanding issues in the negotiation.' ").
169. See TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.1 (providing "effective market protec-
tion" to biologics).
170. See Kilic & Pine, supra note 168 ("In late 2013, the United States Trade Representa-
tive . . . proposed 12 years of exclusivity (which functions as marketing exclusivity rather
than data exclusivity) for biologics in the TPP, even though this contradicts and is mutually
exclusive with the Administration's domestic policy proposals."); see also 42
U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) (providing twelve years of protection for biologics).
171. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.1(a).
172. Compare id., with id. arts. 18.47.1, 18.50.1(a).
173. Id. art. 18.51.1(b)(ii).
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parties might "require changes to their law" to comply with the final-
ized agreement.17 4 The TPP intellectual property chapter therefore in-
cludes transition arrangements in its final provisions.1 7 5 Specifically,
Article 18.83 sets out the transition periods for agrochemical, pharma-
ceutical, and biological products for Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia,
Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam.17 6 The Agreement also contains annexes
clarifying the obligations of Chile, Malaysia, and Peru regarding the
protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and bi-
ological products.1 7 7
Although the United States signed the TPP Agreement under the
Obama Administration, President Donald Trump directed the United
States Trade Representative to "withdraw the United States as a sig-
natory to the [TPP and] . . . from TPP negotiations."17 8 In the wake of
this withdrawal, the eleven remaining TPP partners established the
CPTPP,1 7 9 which they signed in Santiago, Chile, on March 8, 2018.180
With ratifications by Mexico, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada,
Australia, and Vietnam-more than the six parties needed to bring the
agreement into force-the CPTPP entered into force on December 30,
2018.181
174. Id. art. 18.83.1 n.160.
175. See id. art. 18.83.
176. See id. art. 18.83.4(a)(iii)-(v) (providing to Brunei Darussalam a eighteen-month
transition period for agrochemical products and a four-year transition period for both phar-
maceutical and biological products); id. art. 18.83.4(b)(vii) (providing to Malaysia a five-year
transition period for only biological products); id. art. 18.83.4(c)(ii), (iv), (v) (providing to
Mexico a five-year transition period for agrochemical, pharmaceutical, and biological prod-
ucts); id. art. 18.83.4(e) (providing to Peru a five-year transition period for pharmaceutical
products and a ten-year transition period for biological products); id. art. 18.83.4(f)(viii), (x),
(xi) (providing to Vietnam a five-year transition period for agrochemical products and a ten-
year transition period for both pharmaceutical and biological products).
177. See id. Annex 18-B.1 ("Nothing in Article 18.50.1 or Article 18.50.2 (Protection of
Undisclosed Test or Other Data) or Article 18.51 (Biologics) prevents Chile from maintaining
or applying the provisions of Article 91 of Chile's Law No. 19.039 on Industrial Prop-
erty . . . ."); id. Annex 18-C. 1 ("Malaysia may ... require an applicant to commence the pro-
cess of obtaining marketing approval for pharmaceutical products covered under [Articles
18.50 and 18.51] within 18 months from the date that the product is first granted marketing
approval in any country."); id. Annex 18-D, pt. 2 (clarifying Perus obligations in relation to
Articles 18.50 and 18.51 of the TPP Agreement).
178. Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017).
179. CPTPP, supra note 13.
180. See Dave Sherwood & Felipe Iturrieta, Asia-Pacific Nations Sign Sweeping Trade
Deal Without U.S., REUTERS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/
asia-pacific-nations-sign-sweeping-trade-deal-without-u-s-idUSKCN1GKOJM?il=0
[https://perma.cc/FMZ9-KA5D] (reporting the signing of the CPTPP).
181. See Ankit Panda, The CPTPP Trade Agreement Will Enter into Force, DIPLOMAT
(Nov. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/the-cptpp-trade-agreement-will-enter-into-
force-on-december-30/ [https://perma.cc/4AAR-FNUX] (reporting Australia's ratification of
the CPTPP); Khanh Vu, Vietnam Becomes Seventh Country to Ratify Trans-Pacific Trade
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Although the CPTPP retains Article 18.47 concerning the protec-
tion of undisclosed test or other data for agrochemical products, the
Agreement suspended Articles 18.50 (for pharmaceutical products)
and 18.51 (for biologics).182 As stated in Article 2 of the CPTPP, which
references the agreement's Annex, "[u]pon the date of entry into force
of this Agreement, the Parties shall suspend the application of [these
two] provisions . . . until the Parties agree to end suspension of one or
more of these provisions."183 In sum, even though the TPP partners
have arguably achieved consensus, the withdrawal of the United
States and the eventual establishment of the CPTPP reveal the con-
tinuous contestations over the international minimum standards for
the protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and
biological products.
B. RCEP
The negotiations for the RCEP were launched in November 2012
between ASEAN and its six trading neighbors (Australia, China, In-
dia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea).18 4 Building on the past
trade and nontrade discussions under the ASEAN+6 Framework, the
negotiations aimed to create an area that "account[s] for almost half of
the world's population, over 30 per cent of global [gross domestic prod-
uct] and over a quarter of world exports."185 These figures compare fa-
vorably with those relating to the TPP, which covers "40% of global
[gross domestic product] and some 30% of worldwide trade in both
goods and services."186
Thus far, it remains unclear whether the finalized RCEP Agree-
ment will contain an intellectual property chapter. Nevertheless, a key
negotiating document, the Guiding Principles and Objectives for Nego-
tiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, specifically
mentions "[t]he text on intellectual property in the RCEP." 187
Pact, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp/vietnam-
becomes-seventh-country-to-ratify-trans-pacific-trade-pact-idUSKCN 1NHOVF [https://perma.cc/
37GM-NVMW] (reporting Vietnam's ratification of the CPTPP).
182. See CPTPP, supra note 13, art. 2, Annex (suspending articles 18.50 and 18.51 of the
TPP Agreement).
183. Id. art. 2.
184. Joint Declaration, supra note 14.
185. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, AUSTL. GOVT DEPT FOREIGN
AFF. & TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BE7-NMNS].
186. David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade Agreements for the Pacific Rim,
33 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 57, 59 (2016).
187. ASEAN Plus Six, Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Com-




Knowledge Ecology International, an NGO active in the health and
intellectual property areas, has also leaked an early draft of the RCEP
intellectual property chapter.1 8 8 Although that draft was dated Octo-
ber 15, 2015 and the negotiating text has most certainly evolved fol-
lowing the United States' withdrawal from the TPP and the CPTPP's
suspension of select TPP provisions, it is highly unlikely that the
RCEP negotiating parties will abandon their plan to include an intel-
lectual property chapter.18 9
As revealed by the leaked October 2015 text, the patent section of
the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter includes a TRIPS-plus
provision requiring the introduction of a data exclusivity regime to
prevent the reliance on, or referral to, test or other data submitted for
marketing approval of pharmaceutical products.190 Proposed by Japan
and South Korea and opposed by ASEAN, Australia, China, India, and
New Zealand, the draft provision reads:
Each Party shall prevent applicants for marketing approval for
pharmaceutical products which utilize new chemical entities from
relying on or from referring to test or other data submitted to its
competent authority by the first applicant for a certain period of
time counted from the date of approval of that application. As of the
date of entry into force of this Agreement, such period of time is
stipulated as being no less than five years by the relevant laws of
each Party.1
Going beyond the TRIPS Agreement, the draft RCEP provision cre-
ates new obligations regarding both data reliance and data referral.192
While Article 1711.6 of NAFTA prohibits data reliance, it does not in-
clude any language on data referral.193 The draft RCEP provision also
adopts the "no less than five years" duration found in NAFTA 194 and
the now-rejected bracketed text in the 1990 Brussels draft of the
188. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Intellectual Property Chapter (Oct.
15 draft) [hereinafter October 15 Draft], http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-IP-
Chapter- 15October2015.docx [https://perma.cc/W32W-PMNB]; see also James Love, 2015
Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://keionline.org/node/2472 [https://perma.cc/C52G-PXSW] (providing the leaked October
15, 2015 text of the proposed RCEP intellectual property chapter).
189. See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 15, at 722 (explaining why the
RCEP Agreement will most likely contain an intellectual property chapter in the end).
190. October 15 Draft, supra note 188.
191. Id. art. 5.16.
192. Id.
193. See NAFTA, supra note 17, art. 1711.6 (providing coverage against only data
reliance).




TRIPS Agreement." In short, as far as the protection of test or other
data for pharmaceutical products is concerned, the draft RCEP intel-
lectual property chapter will feature a TRIPS-plus obligation that
moves the protection standard closer to, and slightly beyond, what
NAFTA requires. 1 96
Interestingly, the draft RCEP chapter does not include any provi-
sion on biologics. The omission is understandable considering the deep
controversy surrounding the provision on biologics that arose toward
the end of the TPP negotiations.1 97 Somewhat surprisingly, the draft
chapter also does not include any provision on agrochemical products.
Without such a provision, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement will
remain the standard for RCEP partners regarding the protection of
undisclosed test or other data for agrochemical products.1 9 8 Thus, the
protection will be limited to unfair commercial use and disclosure, and
countries will be free to set the duration of such protection.9 9
C. USMCA
In August 2017, the Trump administration began its re-negotia-
tion of NAFTA in Washington, D.C. 20 0 Signed in December 1992,
NAFTA is a trilateral agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States.201 As far as the protection of undisclosed test or other
data is concerned, NAFTA is highly important because Articles
1711.5 and 1711.6 provided the United States with a negotiating
template to develop Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.202 Even
more interestingly, NAFTA has provided TRIPS-plus standards in
195. See discussion supra text accompanying note 68.
196. See Public Citizen, supra note 72, at 4-5 (explaining the potential danger created by
the market exclusivity provision in the draft RCEP intellectual property chapter).
197. See Abbott, Evolution of Public Health Provisions, supra note 168, at 55 (noting that
the negotiation of that provision "was perhaps the most controversial part of the TPP nego-
tiations"); Kilic & Pine, supra note 168, at 1 (noting that the negotiation of that provision
was "considered 'one of the most difficult outstanding issues in the negotiation' ").
198. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
199. See discussion supra Section II.A.
200. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces First
Round of NAFTA Negotiations (July 19, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/july/ustr-announces-first-round-nafta [h tps://perma.cc/3GU7-692F].
201. NAFTA, supra note 17.
202. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) ("NAFTA was a kind of blueprint for the TRIPS Agreement of
1994. It set out, and largely obtained, many of the [intellectual property] objectives that [the
United States Trade Representative] hoped to later codify during the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations."); see also supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (discussing
the inclusion of NAFTA-like language in the Brussels draft of the TRIPS Agreement).
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the area of undisclosed test or other data even before the TRIPS
Agreement came into existence.203
Initially, Canada was more reluctant than Mexico to complete the
renegotiation. At one point, President Trump threatened to abandon
Canada and conclude the agreement with Mexico alone.204 Such a bi-
lateral agreement would reverse the historical picture when Canada
and the United States first established an agreement before extending
that agreement o Mexico.205 Nevertheless, Canada eventually reached
an agreement with the United States on September 30, 2018.206 Ex-
actly two months later, the three countries signed the finalized agree-
ment, which has now been named the USMCA. 207 Included in this
newly negotiated agreement is Chapter 20, which focuses on the pro-
tection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. 20 8 Out of the
ninety provisions in that chapter, three relate to the protection of un-
disclosed test or other data: Article 20.45 (for agrochemical prod-
ucts), 209 Article 20.48 (for pharmaceutical products), 210 and Article
20.49 (for biologics). 211
There are many similarities between the TPP and USMCA provi-
sions on the protection of undisclosed test or other data for agrochem-
ical, pharmaceutical, and biological products. Indeed, the USMCA has
203. See Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 27 ("[E]ven though NAFTA was
adopted in 1992 before the TRIPS Agreement, this earlier instrument ended up being a
TRIPS-plus agreement in regard to the protection of clinical trial data.").
204. See Heather Long, Trump Threatens to Leave Canada Behind on NAFTA, Warns
Congress Not o "Interfere," WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/09/01/trumps-playing-tough-with-canadians-he-needs-them/?utm-
term=.b2b33b09164b [https://perma.cc/PPJ5-UHHE] (reporting President Trump's warning
that the United States would be willing to move forward with a North American trade pact
with only Mexico).
205. NAFTA was developed out of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement,
which Canada and the United States established in January 1988. Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281.
206. See Heather Long, U.S., Canada nd Mexico Just Reached a Sweeping New NAFTA
Deal. Here's What's in It., WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/10/01/us-canada-mexico-just-reached-sweeping-new-nafta-deal-heres-whats-
it/?utmterm=.1469960a085d [https://perma.cc/FN2X-RXUX] (reporting the agreement
reached by Canada, Mexico, and the United States).
207. USMCA, supra note 16; see also Peter K. Yu, Trump's Trade Policy Is More Predict-
able and Less Isolationist Than Critics Think, CONVERSATION (Feb. 1, 2017, 9:57 PM),
https://theconversation.com/trumps-trade-policy-is-more-predictable-and-less-isolationist-
than-critics-think-72243 [https://perma.cc/3J8C-AX8V] (explaining why trade deals under
the Trump administration are unlikely to be developed through a region-based approach,
such as an approach based on North America).
208. USMCA, supra note 16, ch. 20.
209. Id. art. 20.45.
210. Id. art. 20.48.
211. Id. art. 20.49.
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arguably exceeded the TPP obligations,212 not to mention the CPTPP's
suspension of the TPP provisions for undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical and biological products. 213 Article 20.45 of the
USMCA, which provides protection for agrochemical products, is vir-
tually identical to Article 18.47 of the TPP Agreement.21 4 Article 20.48
of the USMCA, which provides protection for pharmaceutical products,
also mirrors Article 18.50 of the TPP Agreement.2 15
The main difference between the USMCA and the TPP Agreement
has to be the provision on biologics. Article 20.49 of the USMCA in-
cludes provisions that align closely with the proposal that U.S. negoti-
ators advanced in the early stages of the TPP negotiations.2 16 Instead
of requiring protections for "at least eight years from the date of first
marketing approval"-as provided for in Article 18.51 of the TPP
Agreement21 7-the USMCA offers protection "for a period of at least
ten years from the date of first marketing approval of that product in
that Party."218 The USMCA, however, does not retain the second TPP
option that allows signatory parties to offer market exclusivity for at
least five years and then supplement such exclusivity with "other
measures" for the remaining years. 2 19
The USMCA biologics provision also omits the review clause in Ar-
ticle 18.51.3 of the TPP Agreement. This review clause provides:
Recognising that international and domestic regulation of new
pharmaceutical products that are or contain a biologic is in a form-
ative stage and that market circumstances may evolve over time,
the Parties shall consult after 10 years from the date of entry into
force of this Agreement, or as otherwise decided by the Commission,
to review the period of exclusivity provided in paragraph 1 and the
scope of application provided in paragraph 2, with a view to provid-
ing effective incentives for the development of new pharmaceutical
products that are or contain a biologic, as well as with a view to
facilitating the timely availability of follow-on biosimilars, and to
212. Compare USMCA, supra note 16, arts. 20.45, 20.48, 20.49, with TPP Agreement,
supra note 12, arts. 18.47, 18.50, 18.51.
213. See CPTPP, supra note 13, art. 2, Annex (suspending articles 18.50 and 18.51 of the
TPP Agreement).
214. Compare USMCA, supra note 16, art. 20.45, with TPP Agreement, supra note 12,
art. 18.47.
215. Compare USMCA, supra note 16, art. 20.48, with TPP Agreement, supra note 12,
art. 18.50.
216. See Kilic & Pine, supra note 168 (discussing the United States' proposal at the TPP
negotiations).
217. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.1(a).
218. USMCA, supra note 16, art. 20.48.
219. Compare TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.1(b) (providing this alternative
option as a compromise between the different TPP negotiating parties), with USMCA, supra
note 16, art. 20.48 (providing no alternative option).
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ensuring that the scope of application remains consistent with in-
ternational developments regarding approval of additional catego-
ries of new pharmaceutical products that are or contain a biologic. 220
Given that the CPTPP has suspended both Articles 18.50 and 18.51
of the TPP Agreement, Articles 20.48 and 20.49 of the USMCA have
revived the TPP provisions as they relate to the trilateral arrange-
ments between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.2 21 Although
the TPP is still on life support,222 and it is unclear whether the United
States will ever join the CPTPP or revive the now-defunct TPP,223 the
recently completed USMCA negotiations suggest that many of the sus-
pended TPP provisions are not completely dead.224 In fact, they may
return to the international intellectual property arena in some form in
the near future.
D. Summary
When the TPP Agreement, the proposed RCEP Agreement, and the
USMCA are considered together, one cannot help but notice three im-
portant developments that have captured the ongoing contestations
over the international minimum standards for intellectual property
protection. First, all of these agreements are so-called TRIPS-plus
agreements, creating obligations beyond the WTO requirements.
While one may question why the RCEP negotiating parties have em-
braced higher standards than what commentators have claimed would
be beneficial to them, their willingness to embrace those standards
suggests the slowly evolving internal developments within these coun-
tries. 225 It will therefore be interesting to undertake a retrospective ex-
220. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.3.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 182-183.
222. See Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 12, at 101-10 (discussing the United States'
withdrawal from the TPP Agreement and its aftermath).
223. See B.S. Chimni, Power and Inequality in Megaregulation: The TPP Model, in
MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING AFTER TPP 124, 138 (Benedict
Kingsbury et al. eds., 2019) ("[T]he suspended [TPP] provisions may be viewed as bargaining
chip to getting the United States on board, allowing it to show some gain in case it agreed to
participate in the future."); Letter from Associate Professor Elizabeth Thurbon, University
of New South Wales to Joint Standing Committee on Trade, Australian Parliament 5 (Apr.
24, 2018), https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=3bbbdeab-f37d-4b9b-a34c-
8235d69a62d9&subld=565436 ("Australian policymakers will seek to use the suspended pro-
visions as bargaining chips to entice the US back into the TPP-fold, primarily for geo-political
reasons.").
224. See Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 12, at 106 ("[T]he various chapters in
the TPP Agreement, including the intellectual property chapter, will continue to provide
the much-needed templates for drafting future bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade
agreements.").
225. See discussion infra Section IV.B (discussing the changing development in China).
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ploration of the contributions of the TRIPS Agreement. Did that Agree-
ment harm developing countries, as many commentators have claimed
at the Agreement's adoption twenty-five years ago? Or did that Agree-
ment help these countries by increasing their economic development
and technological proficiency?
Second, the different standards between the TPP Agreement, the
proposed RCEP Agreement, and the USMCA show the slow transfor-
mation of disagreements and contestations into what Kal Raustiala
has described as "strategic inconsistenc[ies]."2 26 These inconsistencies
"occur H when actors deliberately seek to create inconsistency via a new
rule crafted in another forum in an effort to alter or put pressure on
an earlier rule."2 27 While the multilateral process-such as the one in-
volving the TRIPS Agreement or other WIPO-administered interna-
tional intellectual property agreements-forced countries to strike
compromises, the existence of multiple regional or plurilateral agree-
ments enabled these countries to set norms that best reflect their ne-
gotiating power and preferred intellectual property positions. It is
small wonder that policymakers and commentators have lamented the
growing fragmentation of the international intellectual property re-
gime. 2 28 As former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy observed, "pro-
liferation [of plurilateral trade agreements] is breeding concern-con-
cern about incoherence, confusion, exponential increase of costs for
business, unpredictability and even unfairness in trade relations."2 29
Likewise, WIPO Director General Francis Gurry lamented how the
ACTA negotiating parties could have likely "tak[en] matters into their
own hands to seek solutions outside of the multilateral system to the
detriment of inclusiveness of the present system."23 0
Finally, the intellectual property chapters in the new regional and
plurilateral agreements neither result in convergence nor divergence
226. Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2007).
227. Id. at 1027-28 (footnote omitted).
228. See generally Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 596-
600 (2007) (discussing the growing "proliferation of international regulatory institutions
with overlapping jurisdictions and ambiguous boundaries"); Peter K. Yu, International
Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1, 13-21 (discussing the development of the "international intellectual property
regime complex").
229. Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Opening Remarks at the Conference on
"Multilateralizing Regionalism" in Geneva (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/spple/sppl67_e.htm [https://perma.cc/6CTS-2XNV].
230. Catherine Saez, ACTA a Sign of Weakness in Multilateral System, WIPO Head Says,




of international intellectual property standards-a question that is of-
ten asked in regard to these agreements.23 1 Consider, for instance, the
comparison between the TPP intellectual property chapter and the
draft RCEP intellectual property chapter.23 2 While the negotiations for
the former were heavily driven by the United States, the negotiations
for the latter feature China and India, two leaders in the developing
world.233 Given the differences, one naturally would expect the RCEP
standards to be much lower than their TPP counterparts. Although
some RCEP standards are indeed lower than TPP standards, others
are the same-while some are even higher.23 4 Given this dizzying ar-
ray of identical, converging, and diverging standards, I have recently
coined the term "crossvergence" to describe the complicated phenome-
non in which different standards have now been included through the
norm-setting exercises advanced by the TPP and the RCEP.235 These
exercises result in neither convergence nor divergence of regulatory
standards, but the simultaneous convergence and divergence-or
crossvergence-of these standards.23 6
IV. ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS
As far as international intellectual property agreements are con-
cerned, commentators have a tendency to focus on developments that
affect the scope, duration, and limitations of the stipulated rights.237
231. See generally GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 12 (collecting ar-
ticles that explore whether the development of new mega-regional agreements has led to
regulatory convergence or divergence).
232. See discussion supra Sections III.A and III.B.
233. See Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and Policy,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 150 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017) ("Lacking a
regional hegemon, Asia is filled with developments spearheaded by three different leaders:
China, India, and Japan."); Yu, Copyright Norm-setting, supra note 12, at 42 ("While the
TPP and the CPTPP evidence the leadership of the United States and Japan, respectively,
many policymakers and commentators consider the RCEP a China-led mega-regional agree-
ment."). See generally Yu, Norm Setters, supra note 15 (discussing the role played by China,
India, and other Asian norm setters in the RCEP negotiations).
234. See Yu, Crossuergence, supra note 12, at 292-93 (noting that the draft RCEP intel-
lectual property chapter includes TPP-plus, TPP-like, and TPP-minus provisions).
235. See id. at 277. The concept of crossvergence draws on literature in other disciplines.
A widely cited example in the international management literature is David A. Ralston, The
Crossuergence Perspective: Reflections and Projections, 39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 27 (2007).
236. See Yu, Crossuergence, supra note 12, at 278 ("[Asia] is likely to see 'regulatory
crossvergence'-a simultaneous convergence and divergence of regulatory standards. Such
crossvergence not only has resulted in the region's development of compromising standards
but has also been highly indicative of the ongoing and future standard-setting efforts in
Asia.").
237. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 12-13 (1988) (providing a brief overview of the




As the two previous Parts already cover the contestations over the
international minimum standards for protecting undisclosed test or
other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products, this Part
addresses three sets of additional complications that have affected
the development of international minimum standards in this area:
new technologies, new politics, and new regulatory spillovers. De-
pending on the specific development, these complications can either
help or harm the TRIPS harmonization project by increasing or re-
ducing contestation.
A. New Technologies
Legal standards have always lagged behind technology. Language in
international treaties has lagged behind even further. As I have noted
in an earlier book chapter, "from initial negotiation to final ratification
to full implementation, it takes a considerable amount of time, effort,
energy, and resources to complete a trade agreement. The rate at which
such an agreement is developed can hardly keep pace with the rate of
technological change."23 8 Likewise, Colin Picker cautioned: "[D]elay is
the rule in the formation of international law. Usually, international
law is created over long periods, by the gradual acceptance of customary
state practice or after long treaty negotiations."23 9
In recent years, two new technological developments have deeply
affected the protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharma-
ceutical and agrochemical products. The first development concerns
the emergence of big-data analytics, which "has transformed the fields
of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major advances
in drug development, clinical practices, and medical financing."240 As
data become more valuable, leading to such a hyperbole as "data is the
238. Peter K. Yu, Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse, in SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
185, 202 (Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds., 2014).
239. Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand
of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 184 (2001).
240. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 22; see also Ryan Abbott, Big Data and
Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information Exchanges to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99
IOWA L. REV. 225, 227 (2013) (noting that " 'big data' is altering new drug development, clin-
ical practices, and health care financing"); Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem:
Intellectual Property Incentives, Market Exclusivity, and the Future of New Medicines, 20
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 32-34 (2018) (discussing the use of big data and in silico screening of
chemical compounds); Jamie Cattell et al., How Big Data Can Revolutionize Pharmaceutical
R&D, McKINSEY & Co. (Apr. 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-
and-medical-products/our-insights/how-big-data-can-revolutionize-pharmaceutical-r-and-d
[https://perma.cc/3NG3-2765] ("In research and development ... big data and analytics are
being adopted across industries, including pharmaceuticals.").
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new oil," 2 4 1 it is understandable why those who develop undisclosed
test or other data for pharmaceutical or agrochemical products would
prefer stronger protection for such data. After all, the more protection
they secure, the more value they can extract from these data. Such
value extraction has become especially complicated when a considera-
ble portion of the value lies in the reuse, or initially unintended use, of
those data.2 4 2
Moreover, the use of big-data analytics in pharmaceutical and ag-
rochemical industries may require the provision of new incentives to
motivate these industries to upgrade legacy technology and to invest
in new analytical tools to optimize innovation, improve clinical trial
efficiency, and strengthen product quality, safety, and efficacy.2 43 With
241. "'Data is the new oil, a phrase that is common currency among leaders in industry,
commerce, and politics, is usually attributed to Clive Humby in 2006, the originator of
Tesco's customer loyalty card." DAWN E. HOLMES, BIG DATA: AVERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
20 (2017); see also MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 74, at 16 (describing data as
"the oil of the information economy"); Teresa Scassa, Data Ownership 1 (Ctr. for Int'l Gov-
ernance Innovation, CIGI Paper No. 187, 2018) ("The commercial value and importance of
data is such that they have been referred to as the 'new oil .... ); The World's Most Valuable
Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/2 1721656-data-economy-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-
valuable-resource [https://perma.cc/RY4S-9X79] (stating that data have "spawn[ed] a lucra-
tive, fast-growing industry [the same way as oil], prompting antitrust regulators to step in
to restrain those who control its flow"). But see HOLMES, supra, at 20 ("[U]nlike oil, data
appears not to be a finite resource."); Lauren Henry Scholz, BigDatals Not Big Oil: The Role
of Analogy in the Law of New Technologies (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 895, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3252543
[https://perma.cc/D8MQ-9CG5] (challenging the data-as-oil analogy); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION: BIG DATA FOR GROWTH AND WELL-BEING
179-80 (2015) (discussing data as a non-rivalrous good); JEROME H. REICHMAN ET AL.,
GOVERNING DIGITALLY INTEGRATED GENETIC RESOURCES, DATA, AND LITERATURE: GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES FOR A REDESIGNED MICROBIAL RESEARCH COMMONS
434-35 (2016) (noting that publicly funded research data and information "gains in value
from broad dissemination and. . . is reusable"); Scassa, supra, at 1 ("[M]any are quick to
point out that data are an infinitely renewable resource.").
242. See Mark Burdon & Mark Andrejevic, Big Data in the Sensor Society, in BIG DATA
IS NOT A MONOLITH 61, 69 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the value in
data "is provided by the fact that personal data can be aggregated with that of countless
other users (and things) in order to unearth unanticipatedbut actionable research findings");
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 74, at 153 ("[I]n a big-data age, most innovative
secondary uses haven't been imagined when the data is first collected."); Margaret Foster
Riley, Big Data, HIPAA, and the Common Rule: Time for Big Change?, in BIG DATA, HEALTH
LAW, AND BIOETHICS 251, 251 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) ("The analysis of Big Data
related to healthcare is often for a different purpose than the purpose for which the data
were originally collected.").
243. See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401 (2016) (calling for the building of infrastructure for transformative
medical innovation to provide incentives for developing personalized medicine and related
diagnostic tests and algorithms); Cattell et al., supra note 240 (estimating that the applica-
tion of big-data strategies "to better inform decision making could generate up to $100 billion
in value annually across the US health-care system, by optimizing innovation, improving
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these costly expenditures,244 one can only assume that private indus-
tries would want stronger protection of their proprietary data to help
recoup those up-front investments.
Notwithstanding the immense and ever-growing value of undis-
closed test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical prod-
ucts, one cannot forget that accurate and reliable big-data analyses
require the existence of large, comprehensive datasets. As Viktor
Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier observed, "big data relies on
all the information, or at least as much as possible."2 45 Moreover, be-
cause of the changing nature of our technological environment, many
relevant data now reside in separate datasets and often in multiple
data storage systems.2 46 In the past decade, computer scientists and
engineers have worked tirelessly to develop ways to analyze data with-
out moving them from one storage system to another.2 47 Thus, if the
ability to undertake big-data analyses is to be maximized, such anal-
yses will require greater sharing of data. Indeed, providing property-
like protection to undisclosed test or other data could fragment the
the efficiency of research and clinical trials, and building new tools for physicians, consum-
ers, insurers, and regulators to meet the promise of more individualized approaches"); Me-
gan Nichols, 5 Ways Big Datals Transforming the Pharmaceutical Industry, GEEKTIME (May
8, 2017), https://www.geektime.com/2017/05/08/5-ways-big-data-is-transforming-the-
pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/FJF6-SYHN] ("Using Big Data and predictive
analysis, companies can conduct effective clinical trials. The patients selected for these trials
can meet certain prerequisites found through multiple databases, and researchers can mon-
itor the participants in real-time.").
244. See Nichols, supra note 243 ("Cost is one of the largest factors in the slow growth
and acceptance of Big Data analytics in the pharmaceutical industry. It's expensive to over-
haul an entire infrastructure, so many companies are breaking changes down into small
compartments in order of priority.").
245. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 74, at 30.
246. See JAMES MANYIKAET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER
FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 12 (2011) ("To enable transformative op-
portunities, companies will increasingly need to integrate information from multiple data
sources."); MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 74, at 46 ("Large datasets do not
exist in any one place; they tend to be split up across multiple hard drives and computers.");
Riley, supra note 242, at 254 ("One of the biggest challenges for Big Data [in the healthcare
space] is linking data from multiple sources so that data describing an individual located in
one source are linked with data about the same individual in other sources."); Michal S.
Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Data Standardization, 94 NYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (man-
uscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326377 [https://perma.cc/8DWZ-4TDR] ("[C]onsider
medical data on patients' responses to a treatment for a rare disease. Unless data was shared
among its collectors and combined into a coherent dataset, it would be difficult to reach a
better understanding of how to treat the disease.").
247. See JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 78-80 (2018) (discuss-
ing Hadoop and other efforts to move the algorithms to the data, as opposed to moving the
data themselves); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 30 (2014) ("Specialized
software technology allows the data in multiple data centers (and spread across tens of thou-
sands of processors and hard-disk drives) to cooperate in performing the tasks of data ana-
lytics, thereby providing both scaling and better performance.").
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data market,248 creating what Rebecca Eisenberg and Michael Heller
have described as the "tragedy of the anti-commons."2 4 9
The second new technological development, which "has ... revolu-
tionized the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries," is the growing
importance and popularity of biologics and personalized medicines.25 0
Thus far, commentators have noted the challenge in obtaining suffi-
cient protection for these products through the patent system.251 Be-
cause biologics involve biological materials, as opposed to chemicals,
their protections often need to rely on process patents rather than
product patents.25 2 In addition, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement
248. See Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data Between Prop-
ertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 257, 260 & n. 16
(2017) (considering "multiple ownership of the same data with considerable negative effects
on access to that data" as "a situation of a 'tragedy of the anti-commons' in which too many
property rights in the same asset lead to inefficient underuse of that asset"); Wolfgang Ker-
ber, A New (Intellectual) Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, 2016
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT]
989, 990 (positing that the introduction of new intellectual property right in data "can
be ... dangerous for innovation and competition in the digital economy, because it might
lead to considerable legal uncertainty, the monopolisation of information, and impediments
for the free flow of data that is so crucial for the digital economy").
249. For discussions of the tragedy of the anti-commons, see generally MICHAEL HELLER,
THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS
INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 49-78 (2010); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticom-
mons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Mi-
chael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).
250. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 22.
251. See Heled, supra note 119, at 450-61 (discussing why patents may not provide suf-
ficient protection to biologics).
252. As Nicholson Price explained:
For biological manufacturing processes, patent protection strategies may dif-
fer because manufacturing methods are unusually central for biologics. Even
more so than for small-molecule drugs, the manufacturing complexity and devel-
opment costs for biologies can serve as a potent barrier to entry, keeping compet-
itors off the market. Thus, the public disclosure required by a patent can lower
that entry barrier by providing information about both the biologic-specific man-
ufacturing process and general manufacturing processes for biologics, making
patents particularly unattractive. Despite the risks of disclosure, some firms pur-
sue process patents.
W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 527 (2014) (footnotes omitted); see also W. Nicholson
Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1051 (2016) (" [B]ecause biologies cannot be described precisely by struc-
ture, the only composition-of-matter patents that should be allowed on biologies are so-called
product-by-process patents. These patents are essentially process patents, as the patentee's
coverage is limited to the particular method it has used." (footnote omitted)); Trevor
Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining Therapeutic Equiva-
lence of Follow-on Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and Commercialization, 2012
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, at 15 (noting that "[t]he products of biologies patents are generally
closely related to substances that already exist in the human body and broad composition of
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does not grant protection to biologics because those products are not
considered "new chemical entities" within the meaning of the Agree-
ment.253 The insufficient protection provided by the TRIPS Agreement
indeed explains why the European Union, Japan, and the United
States have eagerly pushed for specific provisions relating to biologics
in bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade negotiations.25 4
Despite the developed countries' active push for new international
norms to protect biologics, it remains difficult to determine ex ante
whether stronger protections in this ever-evolving field would acceler-
ate or stifle the future development of biologics and personalized med-
icines. It is equally unclear whether the existing models in the Euro-
pean Union or the United States would provide suitable "transplants"
for other countries.25 5 Given this uncertainty, it is no surprise that ef-
forts to set the standards for protecting biologics have been highly con-
troversial toward the end of the TPP negotiations.25 6 With the United
States' withdrawal from the TPP, the eleven remaining TPP partners
quickly suspended Article 18.51, which likely would not have been
adopted without the heavy pressure exerted by U.S. negotiators.257 As
matter claims are usually disallowed for proteins that already exist in nature," and that
"biologics developers may need to rely on protections offered by process patents").
253. See Ragavan, (Re)Newed Barrier, supra note 62, at 1185 ("On the face of it, biologies
are not included within the scope of Article 39.3's requirement to protect new chemical enti-
ties. The [new chemical entities] should not, by definition, include biologics." (footnote omit-
ted)). As Professor Ragavan explained:
Considering that data exclusivity is for "new" "chemical" entities, it would be
harder to justify data protection for biologics that are denied patent protection
because they lack novelty on account of falling within the scope of "naturally
occurring products." There is nothing in Article 39 that requires something that
is not considered "new" in patent law to be treated as "new" for the purpose of
data exclusivity.
Id. at 1186.
254. See, e.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51 (introducing a marketing exclu-
sivity regime to protect biologics).
255. For discussions of legal transplants, see generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); Peter K. Yu, The Trans-
plant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in China, in GOVERNANCE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINAAND EUROPE 20 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016); Paul
Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses andMisuses of Comparative
Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Peter K. Yu, Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Trans-
planted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175 (2014); Peter K. Yu, Customizing Fair Use Trans-
plants, 7 LAWS 9, at 5-7 (2018), http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/7/1/9 [https://perma.cc/
MM96-PN7C]; Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693 (2010); Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolu-
tion, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 111.
256. See supra authorities cited in note 168.
257. See discussion supra text accompanying note 183.
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to the RCEP negotiations, provisions regarding the protection of bio-
logics did not even make it to the leaked October 2015 draft.25 8 If TPP-
like language had been advanced before that draft, such language did
not seem to have generated enough traction or support to allow it to
continue into the tenth negotiation round in Busan, South Korea in
October 2015.259
Taken together, these two new technological developments illus-
trate some of the nonlegal challenges countries may likely encounter
in setting international norms for protecting undisclosed test or other
data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products. Policymakers and
negotiators not only need to determine the appropriate scope, dura-
tion, and limitations of the stipulated rights but they should also an-
ticipate what new technologies will emerge and how these technologies
will affect the pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries. To help
avoid overprotection, unnecessary complications, and unintended con-
sequences, I have called on "policymakers and commentators [to] care-
fully tailor [any] new protection [in this area] to only those areas that
have empirically proven needs."26 0 Even if stronger protection of undis-
closed test or other data would be beneficial to select products-biolog-
ics and orphan drugs, perhaps261-such protection should not automat-
ically extend across the board to all pharmaceutical and agrochemical
products.
B. New Politics
While the arrival of new technologies has undoubtedly generated
challenges to the TRIPS harmonization project and efforts to set new
international intellectual property norms, changing positions in the
258. October 15 Draft, supra note 188.
259. See Tenth Round of Negotiations-12-16 October 2015, Busan, Korea, AUSTL. GOVT
DEPT FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE (Oct. 16, 2015), https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/
rcep/news/Pages/tenth-round-of-negotiations- 12- 16-october-2015-busan-korea.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JJ9S-9CCR] (providing a brief recap of the tenth round of RCEP negotia-
tions in Busan, South Korea during October 12-16, 2015).
260. Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 11, at 32; see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Against
"Data Property," in 3 KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48, 70 (Hanns Ullrich et
al. eds., 2018) ("Any new right should be contemplated only after conducting thorough eco-
nomic, evidence-based research that demonstrates a real need for the right and predicts its
consequences for information markets and society at large."); WILLIAM PATRY, How TO FIx
COPYRIGHT 52 (2012) (noting the need for "mandatory, independently-produced, impartial,
empirically rigorous impact statements before any new copyright legislation is passed"); Pe-
ter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 918-
22 (2011) (noting the need for the proponents of intellectual property reform to provide cred-
ible empirical support).
261. See Skillington & Solovy, supra note 37, at 9-10 (discussing the Orphan Drug Act
and how it has helped to increase the supply of drugs to treat rare diseases).
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developing world have also greatly complicated the negotiating pic-
ture. Indeed, as far as international intellectual property negotiations
are concerned, the traditional North-South divide has become increas-
ingly untenable.
To be sure, there remains significant and continuous disagreement
between developed and developing countries over the appropriate level
of intellectual property protection and enforcement, which has re-
sulted in the extension of the TRIPS transition periods262 and the ex-
pansion of the compulsory licensing arrangement hrough the newly
adopted Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement.2 63 Nevertheless, the po-
sitions of developing countries are slowly evolving. While the willing-
ness of China, India, and other large developing countries to accept
higher intellectual property standards in the RCEP negotiations re-
flects this evolving picture,264 China's recent proposal for higher stand-
ards for protecting undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical
and biological products is particularly revealing.265
262. See Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 61, at 1568 (noting the extension of TRIPS
transition periods). For discussions of these transition periods, see generally Frederick M.
Abbott, Technical Note: The LDC TRIPS Transition Extension and the Question of Rollback
(ICTSD Programme on Innovation, Technology and Intellectual Property, Policy Brief No.
15, 2013), http://ictsd.org/downloads/2013/05/the-ldc-trips-transition-extension-and-the-
question-of-rollback.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BJM-92MN]; Arno Hold & Bryan Christopher
Mercurio, After the Second Extension of the Transition Period for LDCs: How Can the WTO
Gradually Integrate the Poorest Countries into TRIPS? (NCCR Trade Regulation, World
Trade Institute, University of Bern, Working Paper No. 2013/42, 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2302335 [https://perma.cc/J2GW-MYJE].
263. General Council, supra note 107.
264. As I noted in an earlier article:
China, India, and other emerging countries within ASEAN+6 ... have begun to
appreciate the strategic benefits of stronger intellectual property protection and
enforcement. Although these countries have yet to embrace the very high protec-
tion and enforcement standards found in the European Union, Japan, or the
United States, they now welcome standards that are higher than what is cur-
rently available in the Asia-Pacific region.
Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 15, at 722.
265. It is worth noting that China does not have all the flexibilities available under Ar-
ticle 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. When China acceded to the WTO, it accepted a WTO-
plus obligation that does not allow for data reliance. As the report of the Working Party on
the Accession of China stated:
The representative of China ... confirmed that China would, in compliance with
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, provide effective protection against unfair
commercial use of undisclosed test or other data submitted to authorities in
China as required in support of applications for marketing approval of pharma-
ceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilized new chemical enti-
ties, except where the disclosure of such data was necessary to protect the public,
or where steps were taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair
commercial use. This protection would include introduction and enactment of
laws and regulations to make sure that no person, other than the person who
submitted such data, could, without the permission of the person who submitted
2019] DATA EXCLUSIVITIES 693
Under this proposal, China will provide six years of protection to
data submitted for regulatory approval of innovative drugs (chuangxin
yao).266 The country will further offer twelve years of protection to data
submitted for regulatory approval of innovative therapeutic biologics
(chuangxin zhiliao yong shengwu zhipin) .267 As if the proposal for in-
creased protection of undisclosed test or other data were not appealing
enough to the pharmaceutical industry, China is currently considering
a limited extension of the patent term based on the period during
which a pharmaceutical product undergoes regulatory review, 268 Simi-
lar to what is provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in the
United States. 269 It is therefore no surprise that seasoned China ob-
server Mark Cohen described these recent developments as "one of sev-
eral exciting new developments in the pharma [intellectual property]
sector in China."2 70
These recent reform proposals are globally significant for three rea-
sons. First, they show that China is no longer content serving as a sup-
plier of active pharmaceutical ingredients, even though it has already
the data, rely on such data in support of an application for product approval for
a period of at least six years from the date on which China granted marketing
approval to the person submitting the data. During this period, any second ap-
plicant for market authorization would only be granted market authorization if
he submits his own data. This protection of data would be available to all phar-
maceutical and agricultural products which utilize new chemical entities, irre-
spective of whether they were patent-protected or not. The Working Party took
note of these commitments.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China ¶ 284,
WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001).
266. Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceuti-
cal Products art. 5, https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/draftdataexclusivityrules.doc
[https://perma.cc/HS3Y-6SYY] (China).
267. Id.
268. See Patent Law of People's Republic of China (Draft) art. 43 (2019) [hereinafter
Draft Fourth Amendment], translated at https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/
2019/01/2019-draft-patent-law-amendment-line-by-line-en-and-cn-by-anjie.doc [https://perma.cc/
W4AR-Y5PH] (providing up to five years of extension of the patent term for innovative drugs); see
also Tim Jackson, China to Allow Patent Extension of Term?, ROUSE (May 16, 2018),
https://www.rouse.com/magazine/news/china-to-allow-patent-extension-of-term/ [https://perma.cc/
U9CG-9LAR] (discussing the potential extension of the patent term for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in China).
269. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018) (providing a limited extension of the patent term based
on the period during which a pharmaceutical product undergoes regulatory review).




been the world's largest supplier of these ingredients2 7 1 and second larg-
est pharmaceutical market.2 7 2 Instead, China wants to develop a re-
search-based pharmaceutical industry.2 73 Its position in this area is con-
sistent with those in other areas. Since the State Council adopted the
National Intellectual Property Strategy in June 2008, 274 China has
taken an innovative turn. Paragraph 7 of that strategy specifically em-
phasized the need for active development of independent intellectual
property (zizhu zhishi chanquan).2 75 Section V of the Outline of the Na-
tional Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Devel-
opment (2006-2020), which the State Council released in February
2006, also included biotechnology among the eight distinct types of fron-
tier technologies-which also include information technology, advanced
materials, advanced manufacturing, advanced energy technology, ma-
rine technology, laser technology, and aerospace technology.27 6
Second, the position China is now taking contrasts sharply with the
position taken by India-another leader of the developing world. As
my colleague Srividhya Ragavan and other commentators have ob-
served, India remains skeptical of the benefits provided by strong pro-
tections for undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and bio-
logical products.27 7 To a large extent, the position India now takes is
271. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 363 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines] (noting that China "is
the world's largest producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients").
272. See Issaku Harada, China Extends Drug Patents to 25 Years, NIKKEI ASIAN REV.
(May 16, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-extends-drug-patents-to-25-years
[https://perma.cc/6RV5-8H2T] ("China's pharmaceutical market is now worth more than
$120 billion, second only to America's.").
273. Cf. LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 54 (2010) ("China has advantages in
producing 'me too' drugs because its capacity to conduct organic synthesis is very strong after
many years of China's being the target for outsourced [multinational pharmaceutical com-
panies'] business.").
274. See THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE
NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STRATEGY], http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_102347 1.htm
[https://perma.cc/GKX8-98Z8] (providing the outline of a new national intellectual property
strategy); see also Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual
Property System, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1079-85 (2018) (discussing the National Intellec-
tual Property Strategy).
275. NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 274, ¶ 7.
276. THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE NATIONAL MEDIUM-
AND LONG-TERM PLAN FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006-2020): AN
OUTLINE § V (2006), https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Cybersecurity/Documents/National
StrategiesRepository/China_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FK3-WYNC].
277. As Professor Ragavan declared emphatically:
[D]ata exclusivity as a tool detrimentally affects generic competition. Thus, it is
no coincidence that India has been pressurized by the [United States Trade Rep-
resentative] to extend the existing 4 year period of data exclusivity to 10 years.
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not that different from the strong opposition it had mounted during
the TRIPS negotiations.2 7 8 Out of the four draft texts for the RCEP in-
tellectual property chapter introduced by the negotiating parties, 27 9
the text from India aligned most closely with the traditional position
taken by developing countries.280 China, by contrast, did not offer any
proposed text despite having a dominant position in the RCEP negoti-
ations.281 Although the country and the population at large remain
deeply concerned about the lack of access to essential medicines-as
reflected in the recent blockbuster Chinese movie Dying to Survive28 2 -
the country's official position during international negotiations and in
policy debates has evolved considerably.
Finally, China is not only eager to develop its research-based rug
industry but is also hoping to use its new laws and policies to attract
For countries like India, it is good to appreciate that generics have become a part
of the global pharmaceutical industry.
Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 41, at 260 (footnote omitted); see also Ragavan,
(Re)Newed Barrier, supra note 62, at 1188 (discussing the four years of data exclusivity pro-
tection provided by Section 122E of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940); Srividhya
Ragavan, The Significance of the Data Exclusivity and Its Impact on Generic Drugs, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. STUD. 131, 140 (2017) (arguing that "India has a perfectly fine data exclusivity
provision" and does not need to strengthen protection in this area); Prashant Reddy T., The
Data Exclusivity Debate in India: Time for a Rethink?, 10 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 8, 17-25 (2014)
(capturing the debate in India on the protection of undisclosed test or other data for phar-
maceutical and agrochemical products).
278. See WATAL, supra note 11, at 19 (discussing the role of hardliner countries at the
TRIPS negotiations); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, upra note 8, at 359 & n. 195 (discuss-
ing the hardliner countries such as "Argentina, [Brazil], Cuba, Egypt, [India], Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia").
279. See Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 15, at 683-84 (noting the sub-
mission of the draft texts).
280. See Gov't of India, Working Draft of IPR Chapter from India: RCEP Negotiations
(Oct. 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/06-RCEP-TNC6-WGIP3-IN-IP-Draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JVA-FBSZ]; see also James Love, 2014 Oct 10: ASEAN Proposals for RECP
IP Chapter, Also India, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INTL (June 8, 2015), http://keionline.org/
node/2241 [https://perma.cc/MX2B-QCDF] (providing the leaked proposal from India).
281. As I previously noted:
In regard to the draft RCEP chapter, ... China did not even advance a proposal.
As revealed by Knowledge Ecology International, the draft proposals came from
other negotiating parties-namely, ASEAN, India, Japan and South Korea. The
only area in which China has taken a more assertive position concerns the dis-
closure in patent applications of the source of origin of genetic resources used in
the inventions, a requirement that already exists in art 26 of the Chinese Patent
Law.
Yu, Copyright Norm-setting, supra note 12, at 43 (footnotes omitted); see also Anupam Chan-
der & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle to Define Asia's Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to
RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331, 358 (2018) (showing that China is the country that is the
least eager to insert a comment on the RCEP text).
282. DYING TO SURVIVE [WO BU SHI YAOSHEN] (Dirty Monkey Films Group 2018). Wo bu
shiyaoshen translates to "I am not God of Medicine."
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foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers.283 Stronger protections for un-
disclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and biological products
will certainly make China a much more appealing place for conducting
clinical trials.2 84 Should foreign pharmaceutical manufacturers decide
to relocate their R&D facilities to China, they will join the electronic
and other industries in moving research centers and other facilities to
China.285 Such relocation will most certainly have a significant global
impact.
C. New Regulatory Spillovers
When the TRIPS Agreement was adopted, intellectual property is-
sues were "arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical."28 6 As Su-
san Sell observed, those issues were "reminiscent of the Catholic
Church when the Bible was in Latin."287 However, as people became
more conscious of intellectual property issues and as policymakers be-
came more comfortable in handling intellectual property matters, we
began to see the use of international regulatory standards outside the
intellectual property area to address intellectual property disputes
and questions.
283. See, e.g., Draft Fourth Amendment, supra note 268; Provisional Measures for the
Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, supra note 266.
284. See Cohen, supra note 270 ("As a policy matter, [the proposed Provisional Measures
for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products] appears in-
tended to help encourage conducting clinical trials in China as well as new product introduc-
tion into the Chinese market[.]").
285. As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson recounted:
[Since 1993], Motorola has built sixteen R&D centers with more than eighteen
hundred people. In 1999, Motorola set up its China Research Institute in Beijing,
which is among the largest facilities of its type in China, and also a world-class
center within Motorola. Between 1985 and 2003, Motorola has applied for 2,305
patents, making it among the biggest patent applicants in China....
Recognizing that it needs to leverage Chinese advantages at every stage of
the value chain in order to strengthen its global competitiveness, Korea's LG
group has gone even further, moving key R&D to China. In 2005 LG hired two
thousand engineers and scientists into its Chinese R&D center, making it LG's
largest R&D site outside Korea. LG has submitted more worldwide patent appli-
cations based on research conducted in China than any other company, with the
exception for Huawei. By placing such emphasis on China-based R&D, LG is
tapping into the secrets of how to deliver high technology at low cost to
strengthen and differentiate its competitive position against rivals such as Sony,
Matsushita, and its archrival Samsung.
ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: How CHINESE COST
INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION 178-79 (2007).
286. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, upra note 8, at 419.
287. SELL, supra note 22, at 99.
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Indeed, the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement has provided a
paradigmatic example of the complications posed by linking the inter-
national intellectual property regime with another international re-
gime-in this case, the trade regime.288 While the traditional discus-
sion of intellectual property issues focuses on incentives, the incentives
question is less central to an inquiry when these issues are explored
through a trade lens.2 89 Oftentimes, policymakers and trade negotia-
tors see intellectual property protection as a mere bargaining chip. As
Michael Geist observed more than a decade ago, in relation to the free
trade agreement negotiations between the United States and the Do-
minican Republic and between the United States and Australia:
Developing countries such as the Dominican Republic view the
inclusion of stronger copyright protections as a costless choice. For
those countries, the harm that may result from excessive copyright
controls pales in comparison to more fundamental development con-
cerns and they are therefore willing to surrender copyright policy
decisions in return for tangible benefits in other trade areas.
Developed countries such as Australia may recognize the im-
portance of a balanced copyright policy to both their cultural and
economic policies, but they are increasingly willing to treat intellec-
tual property as little more than a bargaining chip as part of broader
negotiation. Since most trade deals are judged by an analysis of the
bottom-line, economic benefits that result from the agreement, and
since quantifying the negative impact of excessive copyright con-
trols is difficult, the policy implications of including copyright
within trade agreements is often dismissed as inconsequential.290
288. As I noted in an earlier article:
[The TRIPS Agreement] not only transformed the international intellectual
property landscape but also necessitated a revision-and for many countries, a
complete overhaul-of the domestic intellectual property system. It is therefore
no surprise that some leading commentators have described the TRIPS Agree-
ment as a "sea change" or "tectonic shift" in international intellectual property
law and policy.
Today, we are at a similar crossroads. Through bilateral, regional, and plu-
rilateral trade and investment agreements, new norms are being developed to
address the investment-related aspects of intellectual property rights. Even
more importantly, these norms will strengthen the ability of private investors,
such as intellectual property rights holders, to sue foreign governments without
the support of their home governments. One therefore cannot help but wonder
whether we are now approaching yet another "sea change" or "tectonic shift" in
international intellectual property law and policy.
Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L.
REV. 829, 831 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Investment-Related Aspects] (footnotes omitted).
289. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 5, at 892-901 (discussing
an emerging "incentive-investment divide").
290. Michael Geist, Why We Must Stand on Guard Over Copyright, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
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In recent years, investment law has also rudely entered the intel-
lectual property domain. Notable examples are the recent investor-
state disputes involving Philip Morris and Australia,29 1 Philip Morris
and Uruguay,292 Eli Lilly and Canada,2 93 and Bridgestone and Pan-
ama.2 94 Indeed, with the arrival of these disputes, one cannot help but
wonder "whether we are now approaching yet another 'sea change' or
'tectonic shift' in international intellectual property law and policy," 295
similar to what we experienced when intellectual property was mar-
ried to trade through the TRIPS Agreement twenty-five years ago.296
20, 2003, at D3. Josef Drexi concurred:
Even if the members of parliament understand the full social implications of the
[new trade] agreement, the situation in which they have to make their decision
is substantially different from adopting autonomous [intellectual property] leg-
islation. Even more than their governments, national parliaments are confronted
with the political strategy of the package approach that does not allow for an
unbundling of the different topics covered by comprehensive free trade agree-
ments. The question before the parliaments is not how to balance most appropri-
ately the conflicting interests of different stakeholders in the framework of na-
tional [intellectual property] legislation, but how to assess and balance the social
costs and benefits of such agreements. While the governments at least have a
chance to influence the outcome of the negotiations of bilateral trade agreements,
the parliaments can only give the approval to an agreement in its entirety or
reject it.
Josef Drexl, The Concept of Trade-Relatedness of Intellectual Property Rights in Times of
Post-TRIPS Bilateralism, in TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET PRINCIPLES 53,
76 (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016); see also Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in Interna-
tional Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 378 (1998) (contending that, for many
countries, "the trade-related benefits that may be obtained from joining a club like the WTO
can outweigh any perceived drawbacks of adopting a new copyright law"); Yu, Access to Med-
icines, supra note 271, at 386 ("Many policymakers in less developed countries are ... blinded
by the benefits their countries may receive in other trade areas under a package deal. . . .").
291. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., PCA Case No. 2012-12,
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015) (using the investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism in the bilateral agreement between Australia and Hong Kong to chal-
lenge the tobacco control measures in Australia).
292. See Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016) (using the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in
the bilateral agreement between Switzerland and Uruguay to challenge the tobacco control
measures in Uruguay).
293. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Gov't of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Final Award (Mar.
16, 2017) (utilizing Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement to seek
compensation for the Canadian courts' invalidation of its patents on two hyperactivity
drugs).
294. See Bridgestone Licensing Sers., Inc. v. Republic of Pan., ICSID Case No.
ARB/16/34, Request for Arbitration (Oct. 7, 2016) (using the investor-state dispute settle-
ment mechanism in the bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States to chal-
lenge the damage award granted by the Supreme Court of Panama in relation to the inves-
tor's action in opposing a trademark registration).
295. Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 288, at 831.
296. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 3 (2007) (stating that "the TRIPS Agreement represented
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In the context of pharmaceutical products, the treatment of intellec-
tual property rights as investments is particularly intuitive consider-
ing the heavy R&D expenditures and the pharmaceutical industry's
longstanding emphasis on their investments. As Frederick Abbott ob-
served:
A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles its
bearer to achieve greater than competitive market rates of return
on investment. The Pharma companies are market-oriented enter-
prises that seek to maximize shareholder returns on investment.
Pharma treats potential intrusion on the security of the patent and
related regulatory support as a threat to return on investment.
Pharma justifies its rent seeking as necessary to the funding of re-
search and development for new medicines....
... The Pharma companies demand rules and enforcement that
will protect their income streams, justifying a high return on invest-
ment as necessary to drug development.297
As if these inter-regime and cross-regime developments were not
complicated enough, the increasing emphasis on data protection has
created additional linkage between the protection of undisclosed test or
other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products and other ar-
eas of data governance. Until such linkage arises, the protection of un-
disclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical prod-
ucts has remained a domain of its own. Article 39 is the only provision
available in Section 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, distinct from the sec-
tions on copyright, patent, trademark, and other forms of intellectual
property rights.298 Nevertheless, some commentators have criticized the
TRIPS negotiators for lumping Articles 39.2 and 39.3 in the same pro-
vision, considering the significant difference between trade secret pro-
tection and the protection of undisclosed test or other data.29 9
a sea change in the international regulation of [intellectual property rights]"); WATAL, supra
note 11, at 2 ("TRIPS is, by far, the most wide-ranging and far reaching international treaty
on the subject of intellectual property to date and marks the most important milestone in
the development of international law in this area."); Charles R. McManis, Teaching Current
Trends and Future Developments in Intellectual Property, 52 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 855, 856
(2008) (noting that "the field of international intellectual property law underwent a tectonic
shift with the promulgation of the [TRIPS Agreement]").
297. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends
in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 41, at 27, 36.
298. Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, § 7, with id. §§ 1-6.
299. Compare id. art. 39.2, with id. art. 39.3; see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of
Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on
Which It Is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 537, 566 n. 108 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg
2019] 699
700 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 46:641
At first glance, undisclosed test or other data that are submitted for
regulatory approval of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products are
viewed as isolated personal data that are keyed to the development of
specific products. However, as pharmaceutical and agrochemical in-
dustries continue to use big-data analytics in R&D and actively deploy
sensors or other devices to capture test results, the line between test
data and sensor-collected data is not as clear-cut as one imagines.3 00
Thus, it is increasingly important to explore the protection and regu-
lation of data as part of a holistic data governance regime.301
Consider, for instance, the European Commission's recent proposal
to create a new "data producer's right" for nonpersonal, anonymized
machine-generated data.302 Traditionally, this proposed right would
eds., 2011) (questioning "why the test data obligations of Art. 39(3) were placed in the same
section as the obligations to protect undisclosed information").
300. Consultants from McKinsey noted the following possibilities:
Advances in instrumentation through miniaturized biosensors and the evo-
lution in smartphones and their apps are resulting in increasingly sophisticated
health-measurement devices. Pharmaceutical companies can deploy smart de-
vices to gather large quantities of real-world data not previously available to sci-
entists. Remote monitoring of patients through sensors and devices represents
an immense opportunity. This kind of data could be used to facilitate R&D, ana-
lyze drug efficacy, enhance future drug sales, and create new economic models
that combine the provision of drugs and services.
Remote-monitoring devices can also add value by increasing patients' adher-
ence to their prescriptions. Examples of devices that are under development in-
clude smart pills that can release drugs and relay patient data, as well as smart
bottles that help track usage. Technology and mobile providers are offering ser-
vices such as data feeds, tracking, and analysis to complement medical devices.
These devices and services, combined with in-home visits, have the potential to
decrease health-care costs through shortened hospital stays and earlier identifi-
cation of health issues.
Cattell et al., supra note 240; see also HOLMES, supra note 241, at 68-69 (discussing the use
of sensor data in the health context, such as those relating to magnetic resonance imaging
scans and wearable devices).
301. See Peter K. Yu, Data Producer's Right and the Protection of Machine-Generated
Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 889-92 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Data Producer's Right].
302. Commission Communication on "Building a European Data Economy," COM(2017)
9 final (Jan. 10, 2017), at 13 [hereinafter Commission Communication]. As the European
Commission explained:
Machine-generated data is created without the direct intervention of a hu-
man by computer processes, applications or services, or by sensors processing
information received from equipment, software or machinery, whether virtual or
real.
Machine-generated data can be personal or non-personal in nature. Where
machine-generated ata allows the identification of a natural person, it quali-
fies as personal data with the consequence that all the rules on personal data
apply until such data has been fully anonymised (e.g. location data of mobile
applications).
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not have affected the protections under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement.3 03 Nevertheless, if sensors are to be used to capture the
motion of patients, or if wearables are deployed to measure the condi-
tions of test subjects,3 0 4 the proposed data producer's right can be im-
plicated in the R&D process,3 05 especially when the test results have
been sufficiently anonymized.3 06 Whether the rights implicated in this
Id. at 9. See generally Yu, Data Producer's Right, supra note 301 (providing a critique of the
proposed data producer's right).
303. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3.
304. As a McKinsey report stated:
[A key] clinical big data lever is collecting data from remote patient monitoring
for chronically ill patients and analyzing the resulting data to monitor adherence
(determining if patients are actually doing what was prescribed) and to improve
future drug and treatment options. An estimated 150 million patients in the
United States in 2010 were chronically ill with diseases such as diabetes, con-
gestive heart failure, and hypertension, and they accounted for more than 80
percent of health system costs that year. Remote patient monitoring systems can
be highly useful for treating such patients. The systems include devices that
monitor heart conditions, send information about blood-sugar levels, transmit
feedback from caregivers, and even include "chip-on-a-pill" technology-pharma-
ceuticals that act as instruments to report when they are ingested by a patient-
that feeds data in near real time to electronic medical record databases. Simply
alerting a physician that a congestive heart failure patient is gaining weight be-
cause of water retention can prevent an emergency hospitalization. More gener-
ally, the use of data from remote monitoring systems can reduce patient in-hos-
pital bed days, cut emergency department visits, improve the targeting of nurs-
ing home care and outpatient physician appointments, and reduce long-term
health complications.
MLANYIKA ET AL., supra note 246, at 45-46.
305. As the McKinsey report continued:
Another promising big data innovation that could produce value in the R&D
arena is the analysis of emerging large datasets (e.g., genome data) to improve
R&D productivity and develop personalized medicine. The objective of this lever
is to examine the relationships among genetic variation, predisposition for spe-
cific diseases, and specific drug responses and then to account for the genetic
variability of individuals in the drug development process.
Id. at 48.
306. As the European Commission explained in relation to the proposed data producer's
right:
Where personal data are concerned, the individual will retain his right to with-
draw his consent at any time after authorising the use. Personal data would need
to be rendered anonymous in such a manner that the individual is not or no
longer identifiable, before its further use may be authorised by the other party.
Indeed, the GDPR [EU General Data Protection Regulation] continues to apply
to any personal data (whether machine generated or otherwise) until that data
has been anonymised.
Commission Communication, supra note 302, at 13; see also Yu, Data Producer's Right, su-
pra note 301, at 920 ("GDPR and other privacy laws cover personal data, while the proposed
data producer's right focuses on non-personal, anonymized machine-generated ata.").
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process should be governed by rules in the intellectual property, trade,
privacy, or other areas remains difficult to determine.
In sum, as the protection in one international regime spills over into
the protection in another, policymakers and commentators need to be
ready to address the complications created when two or more regimes
overlap. It is unclear whether such overlap will strengthen or weaken
the protection of undisclosed test or other data-or, for our purposes,
whether such overlap will advance or stifle the TRIPS harmonization
project. It is nevertheless quite certain that the overlap will complicate
future negotiations in this area. The more complicated the negotia-
tions are, the less well-equipped trade negotiators will be to handle all
of the negotiations involved. For a harmonization project that has been
driven heavily by trade negotiators, the complications caused by in-
creasing spillovers of regulatory standards from overlapping interna-
tional regimes is indeed a major concern.
V. LESSONS
Thus far, this Article has explored the contestations between devel-
oped and developing countries over the international minimum stand-
ards for protecting undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products.3 07 The Article has also identified three ad-
ditional challenges that could affect the development of new interna-
tional intellectual property norms.3 08 This Part turns to the various
lessons one can glean from studying the past twenty-five years of
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus developments surrounding the protection of
undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical
products.
First, although voluminous literature has already shown that the
TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
agreements have ratcheted up the standards for intellectual property
protection,3 09 one should be cautious when evaluating the successes
and limitations of the TRIPS harmonization project.3 10 Although Arti-
cle 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement successfully introduced new interna-
tional norms concerning the protection of undisclosed test or other
data, one could locate significant limits to this harmonization project
307. See discussion supra Parts II and III.
308. See discussion supra Part IV.
309. See generally authorities cited in supra note 9.
310. See Susy Frankel, The Fusion of Intellectual Property and Trade, in FRAMING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: INTEGRATING INCENTIVES, TRADE,
DEVELOPMENT, CULTURE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 89, 102 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Eliza-
beth Siew-Kuan Ng eds., 2018) ("TRIPS did not harmonize and, as its negotiating history
shows, could not have harmonized many intellectual property standards.").
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based on the limited language in Article 39.3, the WTO dispute be-
tween Argentina and the United States, and the continuous contesta-
tions over the appropriate international intellectual property stand-
ards both inside and outside the WTO.
Second, from the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement to the devel-
opment of TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements,
power politics has heavily driven the negotiating process. The compro-
mises struck in the development of Article 39.3 vividly show the sig-
nificant divide between developed and developing countries.3 1 1 The
continuous contestations over international minimum standards in
TRIPS-plus agreements also reveal the different positions taken by
key demandeurs in the developed world-notably the European Union,
Japan, and the United States. Indeed, the negotiating history sur-
rounding the increased protection of undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical and agrochemical products is highly interesting be-
cause it has been affected by not only the traditional North-South di-
vide but also the strong disagreements between developed countries.3 1 2
Until these powerful countries come together to present a united ne-
gotiating front-similar to what they did at the TRIPS negotia-
tions3 13-they will have tremendous difficulty in convincing developing
countries to offer stronger protection in this area.
Third, because of the continuous contestations within and outside
the WTO, developing countries still retain considerable flexibilities
concerning the protection of test or other data for pharmaceutical and
agrochemical products. There are two different types of flexibilities:
311. As Jayashree Watal recounted:
[O]n a lot of issues, including in the politically sensitive areas such as patents,
trade secrets and test data protection, there were North-North differences that
persisted until the end. Developing countries such as India participated in nego-
tiating each provision of the TRIPS Agreement, contrary to certain accounts.
They seized opportunities that were offered on account of these intra-North dif-
ferences, wherever they became aware of such discord.
Jayashree Watal, Patents: An Indian Perspective, in MAKING OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT,
supra note 109, at 295, 301.
312. See Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and
Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 41, at 97, 102-10 (distinguishing be-
tween the U.S., EU, and Canadian models for protecting undisclosed test or other data for
pharmaceutical and agrochemical products).
313. See WATAL, supra note 11, at 44 (noting that the European Communities, Japan,
and the United States managed to coordinate their positions "through discussions and nego-
tiations amongst relevant segments of industry and government aided by [intellectual prop-
erty] specialists, at the preparatory stages as well as during the Uruguay Round"); Yu, Cur-
rents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 363 ("Although the initial positions and national
laws of the European Community, Japan, and the United States differ significantly, they
managed to present 'fairly coordinated positions' during the negotiation process." (quoting
WATAL, supra note 11, at 44)).
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consensus-based flexibilities and contestation-driven flexibilities. The
built-in flexibilities explicitly provided by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement belong to the first type, while the considerable variations
in the different regional and plurilateral agreements concerning the
protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and ag-
rochemical products belong to the second type. As Part III noted, the
TPP, the RCEP, and the USMCA all feature TRIPS-plus standards for
the protection of these data.3 14 Nevertheless, the standards in these
three agreements vary considerably, with the USMCA being the
strongest and the RCEP being the weakest.315 To a large extent, the
variations in these agreements provide developing countries with the
much-needed "wiggle room"3 16 to develop their laws and policies re-
garding the protection of undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceu-
tical and agrochemical products. Thus, even though TRIPS-plus bilat-
eral, regional, and plurilateral agreements have eroded the consensus-
based flexibilities provided by the TRIPS Agreement, developing coun-
tries continue to benefit from contestation-driven flexibilities.
Fourth, although commentators often describe developing countries
as if they were a homogenous group, the slowly changing policy posi-
tion taken by China suggests the increased complexity concerning po-
sitions taken by developing countries.31 7 To be sure, many interna-
tional intellectual property negotiations are still conducted along the
North-South fault lines. 318 Nevertheless, the traditional divide be-
tween developed and developing countries does not fully capture the
interests and aspirations of the latter group of countries. Indeed, as
noted by commentators, myself included,31 9 there is a growing need to
314. See discussion supra Part III.
315. Compare USMCA, supra note 16, arts. 20.45, 20.48, 20.49, with TPP Agreement,
supra note 12, arts. 18.47, 18.50, 18.51, and October 15 Draft, supra note 188, art. 5.16.
316. See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 28 (1997) (contending that "the TRIPS
Agreement leaves developing countries ample 'wiggle room' in which to implement national
policies favoring the public interest in free competition").
317. See discussion supra Section IV.B (discussing China's innovative turn and changing
position in the pharmaceutical area).
318. For the Author's discussions of the positions taken by developing countries in inter-
national intellectual property regime, see generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Nego-
tiations, the BRICS Factor and the Changing North-South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS'
GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION 148 (Rostam J. Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017); Peter K. Yu,
TRIPS Wars: Developing Countries Strike Back, in FLASHPOINTS: CHANGING PARADIGMS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAW (Alexandra George ed., forthcoming 2019);
Yu, TRIPS Game, supra note 29; Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 6.
319. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Middle Intellectual Property Powers, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 84
(Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) (discussing the complications created by
emerging intellectual property powers).
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develop new taxonomies to describe the different, and at times com-
plex, positions taken by China, India, and other emerging countries.3 20
For example, one could replace developed and developing countries
with "high-income, middle-income, and low-income" countries.321
ternatively, countries could be grouped together based on such factors
as technological proficiency3 22 and patent intensity.32 3
Fifth, there is an inevitable cat-and-mouse chase between interna-
tional treaties and technological developments. The complications
posed by the arrival of big-data analytics and the increased importance
and popularity of biologics and personalized medicines aptly illustrate
the considerable difficulties in, if not impossibility of, anticipating fu-
ture technological challenges. It is telling that the TPP intellectual
property chapter includes a review clause that "[r]ecogni[zes] that in-
ternational and domestic regulation of new pharmaceutical products
that are or contain a biologic is in a formative stage and that market
circumstances may evolve over time."32 4 Indeed, shortly after the adop-
tion of the TRIPS Agreement, some commentators took the position
that the Agreement was obsolete upon arrival.325 While limited cover-
320. See Basheer & Primi, supra note 4 (noting that countries can be technologically
proficient even though they may not be economically developed, especially on a per capita
basis); Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining The-
ory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 265, 271 (2010) (noting the need to separate
countries based on their bargaining power within the international intellectual property re-
gime); Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential
Treatment in WTO Law: Criteriafor Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries,
26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 41 (2005) (noting that the U.N. classification of developed, de-
veloping, and least developed countries "is an inappropriate basis for achieving an equitable
balance between the rights of patent owners and users").
321. See Peter K. Yu, Crossfertilizing ISDS with TRIPS, 49 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 345
(2017) (using the trichotomy of "high-income, middle-income, and low-income" countries to
replace the dichotomy of developed and developing countries).
322. See Basheer & Primi, supra note 4 (calling for greater differentiation of developing
countries based on their technological proficiencies).
323. See generally DANIEL BENOLIEL, PATENT INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2017)
(providing an empirically based alternative conceptual framework for grouping countries to-
gether for policy analysis).
324. TPP Agreement, supra note 12, art. 18.51.3.
325. As Marci Hamilton aptly observed:
Despite its broad sweep and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the scene
already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at the same time that the on-line era
became irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not even a nod, to the fact that
a significant portion of the international intellectual property market will soon
be conducted on-line.
Marci A Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 614-15 (1996). Likewise, Jerome Reichman declared:
[The principal weakness of the TRIPS Agreement] stems from the drafters' tech-
nical inability and political reluctance to address the problems facing innovators
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age of Internet-related issues provides a good indication of its obsoles-
cence,326 the TRIPS Agreement's inability to capture the latest innova-
tions in the biotechnology area foreshadows many of the challenges we
see today in the area of biologics.327
Finally, given the ubiquity of technology-related issues and the
growing attention devoted to intellectual property law and policy,
standards in the international intellectual property regime are in-
creasingly linked to-if not affected by-developments and expecta-
tions in other international regimes. John Braithwaite, Peter Drahos,
and Laurence Helfer were right to underscore the active forum-shift-
ing or regime-shifting activities in the international arena.3 2 8 Such ac-
and investors at work on important new technologies in an Age of Information.
The drafters' decision to stuff these new technologies into the overworked and
increasingly obsolete patent and copyright paradigms simply ignores the sys-
temic contradictions and economic disutilities this same approach was already
generating in the domestic intellectual property systems.
J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared Badly,
and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (footnote
omitted).
326. See Hamilton, supra note 325, at 615 (criticizing the TRIPS Agreement for
"mak[ing] no concession, not even a nod, to the fact that a significant portion of the interna-
tional intellectual property market will soon be conducted on-line"); Peter K. Yu, Teaching
International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923, 933 (2008) ("The drafters
[of the TRIPS Agreement] . . . did not anticipate all of the latest technological changes. A
good example of these unanticipated changes concerns the technological change brought
about by the information revolution."); Yu, Achilles'Heel, supra note 143, at 502-03 (discuss-
ing the technological challenges that have prevented the TRIPS Agreement from providing
effective global enforcement of intellectual property rights).
327. See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA 239, 247-
48 (2012) ("Although the biotechnology revolution had already raised many difficult policy
and ethical questions by the mid-1980s, Article 27 provides only very limited coverage of
biotechnology-related issues.").
328. For excellent discussions of the regime-shifting phenomenon, see generally JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Laurence R.
Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellec-
tual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004). As Professors Braithwaite and
Drahos explained:
International forum-shifting was not an important strategy prior to the Sec-
ond World War, when the number of international fora was so small as to afford
little choice. It became an important strategy for the first time during the era of
US hegemony. The US state in fact translated its "national legal pastime" of fo-
rum-shifting into the realm of international regulatory contests. When it is star-
ing at defeat on a given regulatory agenda in a given international forum it shifts
that agenda to another forum, or simply abandons that forum. Part of its think-
ing behind abandonment is that the abandoned international organization will
be shocked into a more compliant mode of behaviour, endeavouring to woo back
the world's most powerful state (and its financial contributions) with more fa-
vourable policies and attitudes . . . . On other occasions forum-shifting is used to
run a parallel agenda in two international fora. Here the strategy is to cast both
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tivities have led to what Christopher May described as "forum prolifer-
ation."3 29 Now that so many international fora have been created, the
overlap between them is inevitable, especially when their coverage ex-
pands. In fact, the more overlap there is between these different inter-
national fora, the more complicated the developments will be. After all,
many international regimes carry with them different players, struc-
tures, language, culture, and values. The questions explored in relation
to intellectual property law are not always the same as those that are
being asked in the health, trade, or investment context.33 0 The answers
to these questions are also likely to be significantly different.331
VI. CONCLUSION
The TRIPS Agreement was adopted with the WTO's formation in
Marrakesh in April 1994. Although commentators have widely recog-
nized the Agreement's ability to impose on developing countries high
standards for intellectual property protection and enforcement, a close
fora in the role of warring suitors, making each strive to do better than the other
in terms of fulfilling the regulatory desires of the US.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra, at 564; see also Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note
8, at 408- 16 (discussing regime-shifting activities).
329. CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION:
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 66 (2007).
330. See Yu, Investment-Related Aspects, supra note 288, at 857 ("Within the intellectual
property field, there is . . . a considerable concern that [investor-state dispute settlement]
arbitrators would subscribe to a narrow view of intellectual property rights. In doing so, they
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scrutiny of developments in the area of test or other data for pharma-
ceutical and agrochemical products suggests considerable limits to the
TRIPS harmonization project. If we are to take stock of the develop-
ments in the TRIPS arena, we need to be conscious of both the suc-
cesses and weaknesses of this project.
Utilizing the protection of undisclosed test or other data for phar-
maceutical and agrochemical products as a case study, this Article as-
sesses whether the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bilateral, re-
gional, and plurilateral agreements have succeeded in facilitating har-
monization of the international minimum standards for the protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The findings show ac-
tive contestations between developed and developing countries that
have been further affected by changing technological developments,
shifting intellectual property politics, and increasing spillovers of reg-
ulatory standards from other international regimes. Although greater
harmonization of international intellectual property norms has been
justified by such benefits as efficiency, consistency, predictability, and
coherence, there is sufficient evidence to show that such harmoniza-
tion remains a work-in-progress-and for good reasons.
It is hard to believe that the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement have
already been around for twenty-five years. Notwithstanding their de-
velopments for a quarter-century, the Agreement remains fairly
young, and its ability to harmonize international minimum standards
has yet to reach the level of earlier and more established international
intellectual property agreements.33 2 It remains to be seen whether the
TRIPS Agreement will eventually succeed in harmonizing the interna-
tional standards for protecting undisclosed test or other data for phar-
maceutical and agrochemical products, but twenty-five years is simply
not enough for us to see the completion of the TRIPS harmonization
project.
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cerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar.
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